The Catholic Church and the Portuguese Dictatorial Regime: the case of Paul VI’s visit to Fátima by Simpson, Duncan
The little-studied visit to Fátima of Paul VI on 13 May 1967 is an
event of particular significance for the understanding of the nature of rela-
tions between Church and State under Salazar.
In order to fully grasp its implications as to the place of the Catholic
Church in the Estado Novo, we shall first establish the historical back-
ground to the visit. A brief history of the relations between Church and
State since 1928 will allow us to broadly define these as relations of per-
sistent collaboration seemingly evolving towards loosened association. A
focused study of the 1964 Bombay crisis and 1965 Rosa de Ouro episode
will enable us to define this collaboration more closely – as one conducted
under the strongly instrumentalist control of the political regime – and
observe the mechanisms of political appropriation of religious events by
the State, as well as the political symbolism of the Fátima shrine itself.
Secondly, we shall study the diplomacy which preceded the papal visit and
observe that the Portuguese dictatorial regime, despite its opposition to the
process of aggiornamento in the Roman Catholic Church, intervened
actively in order to “secure” the presence of Paul VI in Portugal. Contrary
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to Salazar’s claims, it did not hesitate to intervene within the internal life
of the Church for political motives, assisted as it did so by the majority of
the national ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thirdly, we will analyse the
inevitable politicisation of the visit, despite the Pope’s efforts to the con-
trary. The political regime, with the collaboration of the national Catholic
hierarchy, was effectively able to adapt the visit to its own needs and
appropriate the papal Legate’s visit politically, while measures such as the
13 May 1967 national bank holiday called into question the much-
asserted separation of Church and State. Fourthly, we shall observe that
the regime, again supported by the national hierarchy – and largely
unhampered by the Pope himself –, succeeded in actively associating
itself to the private pilgrimage of Paul VI to Fátima. Finally, we shall turn
our attention to the effects of the visit in Portugal herself. Efficient pro-
paganda meant it served to effectively “legitimise” the colonial wars, re-
affirm the regime’s ideological basis, and strengthen its domestic position
politically by “cornering” the opposition further, evidence of the funda-
mental role of the Portuguese Catholic Church in legitimising the Estado
Novo still in 1967.
1. The background to the visit: Paul VI’s visit to Bombay and the
Rosa de Ouro
The period preceding the Pope’s visit to Fátima was marked by a seri-
ous crisis in the relations between Church and State, owing to the Pope’s
decision to attend the December 1964 Eucharistic Congress in Bombay.
Though part of a broad trend of slowly deteriorating relations, it was a cri-
sis quite uncharacteristic of the nature of such relations since the inception
of the Salazar regime in the late 1920s, of which a brief account must first
be made.
1.1. A brief summary of Church-State relations from 1928 to 1964
The history of the relations between Church and State from 1928 to
1964 may be broadly divided into three periods.
Until 1945, close collaboration prevailed. As Costa Pinto argues, it is
possible to speak of an «ideological and political nucleus common to the
Church and the regime, including corporatism, anti-liberalism and anti-com-
munism», which meant that, until at least the end of the Second World War,
the close association of Church and State «transcended a mere convergence
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of interests» 1. Within the movement of “national regeneration” launched
by the Salazar regime in the early 1930s, the Church was given the central
task of leading the nation’s “re-christianisation”, following decades of
liberal and republican secularisation, while “forming” its followers in the
“interest of the Nation”, as Salazar would later make clear 2. Catholicism
thus re-emerged “tightly woven into the nation’s historic formation
through its rituals and official discourse” 3, while the “youth organisations
of the regime were set up within the framework of the nationalist and
Catholic reform of the education system” 4. Despite certain tensions — most
noticeable in 1932 as Salazar called for an end to the political activities of
the Centro Católico and “invited” its members to join the União Nacional
–, in 1936 the episcopate expressed its full support for the regime in a Carta
Pastoral, reaffirmed the following year by the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon
and head of the Portuguese Catholic Church, Manuel Gonçalves Cerejeira 5.
The culminating point in this relation of close collaboration came on 7 May
1940 with the signing of a Missionary Agreement and Concordat, «acordo
de mútuas compensações, (…) com (…) benefícios recíprocos» 6, settling a
wide range of issues 7. Though a Concordat of separation, it was one in
which the establishment of recognised spheres of intervention was designed
to improve effective collaboration – in marked contrast to the April 1911
Law of Separation of Afonso Costa 8. The difficulty of the negotiations
which preceded the signing of the Concordat, however, demonstrate both
how much the Church remained eager to re-establish its influence, and how
equally determined Salazar was in preventing any religious intervention
within the political sphere, preserve of the State.
That the Catholic Church should enjoy good relations with a regime
headed by a former leading figure of the Catholic movement seems only
1 Pinto, Salazar’s dictatorship and European fascism, p. 200.
2 Letter to the Nuncio, dated 6 December 1958, in Braga da Cruz, O Estado Novo
e a Igreja Católica, p. 126.
3 Pinto, op. cit., p. 193.
4 Idem., p. 198.
5 In Braga da Cruz, op. cit., p. 31.
6 Braga da Cruz, in Nova História de Portugal, dir. Serrão, Oliveira Marques, vol. 12,
p. 208.
7 Partial compensation for property “lost” by the Church since the start of the lib-
eral era, to define but one.
8 Who had revealingly forecast an “end to Catholicism in several generations”,
Wheeler, Republican Portugal, p. 69.
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logical 9. Collaboration, moreover, had much to offer to both parties. The
Portuguese Catholic Church in 1928 was merely beginning to recover
from the trauma of the First Republic. Through close cooperation it hoped
to regain much of its lost prestige and influence – not to mention the eccle-
siastical goods confiscated since the start of the liberal era. The new
regime, on the other hand, reaped instant benefits from this collaboration.
Indeed, as Braga da Cruz argues, «[a Igreja] possibilit[ou] ideologica-
mente a incorporação de massas no regime» 10, all the more so in a coun-
try of strong Catholic tradition 11. In his analysis of the Estado Novo’s
remarkable longevity, Rosas identifies as an important structural factor the
«massa de pequeno campesinato. (…) Enquadrada ideológica e politica-
mente pelos párocos da Igreja católica e [o] cacicado [local] (…) essa
imensa massa rural despolitizada, analfabeta, submissa, funcionará his-
toricamente como um pesado lastro de estabilização e conservação da
‘ordem estabelecida’» 12. To Salazar, the Church would effectively consti-
tute not only an instrument of institutional support – and even of dissua-
sive repression which often dispensed the political police from having to
intervene 13 – but also a tool in the effort to turn his organic vision of soci-
ety into a reality.
The international context emerging after the Second World War would
bring new pressures to bear on the collaboration between Church and
State. Many of the changes in the international scene are obvious. The
totalitarian regimes of Western Europe had been defeated and conse-
quently growing credit was being given to democratic principles.
Moreover, the defeat of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany naturally affected
enthusiasm for Portuguese nationalism 14, with which Catholicism had
closely been interwoven in official discourse. Catholics in Portugal also
witnessed the rise of Christian Democrat parties in Western Europe, such
9 Elected to parliament for the Centro Católico in 1921, Salazar became regional
party leader in Coimbra in 1925, and was by 1928 publicly considered a “representante dos
católicos”, Cruz, As Origens da Democracia Cristã e o Salazarismo, p. 16.
10 Cruz, in Nova História de Portugal, dir. Serrão, Oliveira Marques, vol. 12, p. 201.
11 97% and 98% of total population declared themselves to be Catholic in the cen-
suses of 1950 and 1960 respectively, though their degree of religiosity remained superfi-
cial. See Rezola, in idem, p. 248-255.
12 Rosas, in Salazar e o Salazarismo, p. 20-21.
13 “Nesta acepção (...) mais profunda da repressão - a repressão das almas”, idem,
p. 30.
14 Cruz, O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica, p. 93-94.
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as the MRP in France 15, and started to question the restrictions imposed on
the Acção Católica Portuguesa (ACP). As the Cold War developed and crit-
icism as to the suppression of civil liberties within Communist regimes grew
accordingly, awareness of the lack of freedom within Portuguese society
also started to emerge within certain lay Catholic activist circles 16.
Increasingly Cerejeira was forced to defend either the position of the Church
within the regime – already in his 8 November 1945 Carta aos católicos
portugueses – or the nature of the regime itself – in the 1956 A situação da
Igreja em Portugal. Along with disagreements over the inefficient imple-
mentation of corporatism, his position reflected growing divisions as much
within Catholic circles as between them and the regime itself.
The post-1945 context had created new social, economic and political
expectations that the regime was neither in condition nor prepared to meet.
The only significant change to be effectively introduced – that of allowing
a platform for legal opposition for presidential elections until the “scare”
of 1958 –, led to a serious crisis in the relations between Church and State
on the issue of intervention by members of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in the
political arena, following the bishop of Porto’s notorious 13 June 1958 let-
ter to Salazar 17. The election of 1958 also signalled the emergence of a dis-
sident trend among lay Catholic militants, some publicly backing the
candidate of the opposition. The majority of Catholic militants, however,
supported Salazar’s candidate, Américo Thomaz 18, for whom there was also
ample evidence of the hierarchy’s support. In Braga noticeably, political
authorities were aided by «priests in every electoral ward to identify parish-
ioners liable to support (…) Delgado, so that they could then be removed
from the voting lists» 19, a tendency confirmed by the fact that the bishop of
Porto himself “rebuked parish clergy for using their sermons to urge the
people to back the regime” 20. Dissidence in 1958 thus remained very
much a marginal trend both within the Catholic hierarchy as well as among
lay militants. If not close collaboration, it was at the very least resolute
15 Idem, p. 94.
16 Idem, p. 103.
17 Though rather than on the election, it concentrated mainly on reservations about
the corporatist system as established by the Estado Novo. The crisis would only begin to
appease as the bishop was forced into exile in July 1959. See Cruz, idem, p. 114-156.
18 Idem, p. 113.
19 Gallagher, Portugal: a Twentieth Century Interpretation, p. 94.
20 Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, p. 360.
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association which characterised the 1945-1958 phase of relations between
Church and State.
The 1960s witnessed the growth of progressive Catholicism among
lay activists, inspired by the process of aggiornamento initiated by John
XXIII. The outbreak of the colonial wars in Angola, Guinea and
Mozambique – in March 1961, January 1963 and September 1964 respec-
tively – exacerbated the divisions within the Catholic sector along pro-
gressive and traditionalist lines, a fact already clearly visible during the
1965 election campaign – as we shall observe in greater detail in the final
part of this work. To a limited extent their disaffection with the regime was
reflected in the position of the hierarchy, as unrest persisted in relation not
only to the question of the involvement of the Church in political questions
and the removal of the bishop of Porto – against which a petition was
signed by 300 Porto clerics in February 1960 –, but also as to the nature of
the Salazar regime itself, as shown by Cerejeira’s letter to the Ministry of
the Interior already in August 1958 lamenting the violent methods of the
PIDE 21. The “case of the bishop of Beira” 22 was also evidence of the
development of progressive views among certain members of the Catholic
hierarchy. Such public acts of defiance, however, were rare. If this final
phase of relations between the Church and the Portuguese State (1958-
-1964) witnessed the development of a substantial lay progressive trend –
whose importance, as we shall see, would later be made clear – it did not
affect the institutional Church in any significant way. As the Bombay and
Rosa de Ouro episodes demonstrate, the Catholic hierarchy’s support for
the regime was not called into question.
1.2. Paul VI’s visit to Bombay
The Pope’s decision to travel to Bombay in December 1964 in order to
take part in the Eucharistic Congress represented for the Portuguese head
of government – who saw in India little more than the illegal occupier of
Goa since December 1961 – no less than a direct affront to the nation as a
whole. On 21 October 1964, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco
Nogueira, officially defined the visit as an «agravo gratuito» 23. In relation
to our present purposes, this crisis would reveal two fundamental points.
21 Cruz, O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica, p. 157.
22 Fierce public critic of the effects of Portuguese colonial policy in Mozambique,
idem, p. 177-178.
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First, the visit to Bombay was to constitute the “mirror-image” of that
to Fátima three years later, in as much as what Salazar criticised about it
was precisely what he himself would be seeking to benefit from in 1967.
«Sua Santidade não quis ver mais que o aspecto religioso da sua decisão,
não se importando do mais», he lamented. «Pode o Santo Padre (...) ape-
nas querer com sua presença dar maior esplendor ao Congresso (...), o que
fica como um dos actos mais relevantes dos nossos tempos é a visita do
chefe da Igreja Católica à União Indiana» 24. To Salazar, papal visits were
official acts never likely to remain apolitical. Such were the moral impli-
cations of the Pope’s mere presence, that inevitably his visit would take on
a political nature – all the more damaging to the Portuguese nation as,
«[como] Sua Santidade (…) sabe bem (…), em política, os actos muitas
vezes transcendem as intenções» 25, the impact of which he was determined
to prevent from reaching Portugal. Less than three years later the Pope’s
presence on Portuguese soil would equally constitute «um dos actos mais
relevantes dos nossos tempos», which the regime would make sure
reached the largest possible audience in order to maximise its “natural”
domestic political effects.
Second, despite Salazar’s constant claims to the contrary and the fact
that, ever since the Constitution of 1933, «o Estado Novo rejeitava (…) em
termos constitucionais (…) qualquer veleidade cesarista de intromissão do
poder político na vida da Igreja» 26, the Bombay crisis demonstrated that
he would not hesitate to intervene within the internal life of the Church
should political necessities require it, assisted as he did so by the majority
of the national Catholic hierarchy.
Determined to prevent the Pope’s visit to Bombay from being publi-
cised in Portugal, alongside the regime’s censorship services, Salazar
expected the collaboration of the Catholic hierarchy. His expectations were
met. «Logo recebi telegrama Vexa», the Portuguese Ambassador to the
Vatican, António de Faria, reported back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
on 1 November 1964, «falei com Senhores Cardeal Patriarca e Arcebispo
Évora que ficaram recomendar padres suas dioceses se abstenham comen-
tar igrejas visita Papa Bombaim e reacção governo» 27. Effectively, the
23 In Mafra, Lisboa no tempo do Cardeal Cerejeira, p. 36.
24 Arquivo de Oliveira Salazar, AOS/CO/NE-30A, Pasta 10, 5ª Subdivisão, carta
para Cerejeira, 21 October 1964, p. 86 (underlined in original).
25 Idem.
26 Cruz, O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica , p. 17.
27 AOS/CO/NE-30A, Pasta 10, 6ª Subdivisão, p. 110.
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Catholic hierarchy was willing to collaborate with the regime’s censorship
exercise, though directed against the Pope himself. Should the lower
hierarchy not obey these instructions – and all did not – the State would
not hesitate to employ more forceful means. PIDE informers were dis-
patched to churches around the country. «Nas Igrejas de Lisboa, com
excepção das da Basilica da Estrela e de Alcântara, não foi feita qualquer
alusão, durante a homília, ao facto», they reported back to Salazar 28.
Several priests from the diocese of Leiria were arrested by the PIDE for
commenting on the Pope’s visit to Bombay. The (feeble) attempt at dissi-
dence by its bishop was rapidly brought into line. Initially siding with the
dissident priests, he was not long in producing a circular to the paroquias
under his responsibility, reminding all clerics of the «conveniência (…) de
se abster (…) de qualquer (…) comentário à vida politica nacional» 29.
State interference within the internal life of the Church was thus clear and
indeed felt most painfully by those clerics who resisted it. The majority of
the ecclesiastical hierarchy, however, did not.
The relation between Church and State as revealed by the Bombay cri-
sis was thus one of close collaboration between the political regime and
the ecclesiastical authorities, conducted under the former’s instrumentalist
control 30. Paradoxically, the crisis with the Vatican had effectively tighte-
ned the links between the regime and the national Catholic hierarchy.
1.3. The “Rosa de Ouro” or the political symbolism of the Fátima
sanctuary
Directly linked with the Pope’s visit to India, a second event of sig-
nificant importance preceded the Pope’s visit to Portugal: the attribution of
the Rosa de Ouro to the Fátima sanctuary on 13 May 1965. A brief analy-
sis of the event will allow us to make three further fundamental points
regarding Church-State relations shortly before the Pope’s visit.
First, active State interference within the religious sphere was again
clear as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to influence the choice of
the Cardinal Legate – or papal representative – to deliver the Rosa de Ouro
28 AOS/CO/PC-76, Pasta 7, 1ª Subdivisão, 26 October 1964, p. 459-460.
29 In idem, 30 October 1964, p. 470.
30 Caetano was certainly right noticing that Salazar tended to treat “de igual para
igual (sinão de cima para baixo) com a Cúria Romana ou a hierarquia do Pais”, in Minhas
Memórias de Salazar, p. 411.
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to Fátima. As early as 23 December 1964, it had expressed its desire to see
the more prestigious Cardinal Secretary of State Cicognani carry out this
mission 31. The Vatican ignored these demands and nominated Cardinal
Cento as Legate. Having been singled out by Faria to Mons. Dell’Acqua
(Vatican Substitute Secretary of State) as unsuitable, «por seu nome estar
ligado período menos feliz relações com Santa Sé relacionado Bispo do
Porto» 32, it was a sign that the Vatican was not disposed to commit a ges-
ture which may be viewed as too strong a political endorsement of the
Salazar regime – which Dell’Acqua’s belief that the mishandling of the situ-
ation was but the result of the “intervenção do diabo” seems to support 33.
Secondly, though the Portuguese government’s intervention within the
religious sphere had proved unsuccessful, it would not prevent it from seeking
to benefit politically from the ceremony due to take place at the shrine.
Quite literally, it would simply have to make do with Cardinal Cento. As
Cardinal Samoré advised Faria in Rome, the Portuguese government ought
to «tirar todo partido possível presença Cardeal Cento capaz de falar com
entusiasmo na nossa língua e de fazer boa impressão nossa opinião
pública» 34. The Vatican was thus well-aware of the intended political
exploitation of what effectively constituted a religious ceremony – if any-
thing, Samoré was effectively encouraging such exploitation. On 28
February 1965, Faria reported to the Foreign Ministry that «melhor será
aceitar as explicações que nos foram dadas e (...) tirar todo o beneficio pos-
sível da ida do Cardeal Cento» 35. Though deeply dissatisfied, by mid-
March Salazar had decided to follow the Cardinal’s advice.
On 13 May 1965, Cento delivered the Rosa de Ouro to Fátima. Among
the 500,000 pilgrims who attended the ceremony was the President of the
Republic himself. Cardinals Cerejeira and Cento were flanked throughout
the proceedings by the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior 36. The fol-
lowing day, a banquet was offered in honour of the Legate, during which
Franco Nogueira declared that the Rosa de Ouro honoured «toda uma
Nação Missionária, devotada e heróica» 37. «Lido para lá das determinações
31 Arquivo Histórico-Diplomático MNE, PEA 481, Telegrama MNE para Faria,
nº geral 5968, 23 December 1964.
32 Idem, Telegrama Faria para MNE, nº geral 1629, 27 February 1965.
33 Idem, Aerograma Faria para MNE, nº geral 1630, 28 February 1965.
34 Idem.
35 Idem, nº geral 1631, 28 February 1965.
36 Carvalho, in História, nº 29, p. 33.
37 Idem, p. 33.
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estritamente protocolares», Carvalho argues, «este cuidadoso cerimonial
denuncia o entronsamento entre os poderes secular e religioso. (…) Teste-
munha também o esforço do governo português e da hierarquia católica
em transformar a homenagem a toda a nação, mesmo tendo o Santo Padre
tido, pelo menos inicialmente, a intenção de retirar ao acontecimento qual-
quer significado político» 38. It was a process which the regime would
develop further two years later.
Finally, it is important to emphasise the fact that the attribution of the
Rosa de Ouro was essentially discussed along compensatory lines. The
day preceding the Pope’s announcement of his visit to Bombay, Samoré,
in conversation with Faria, had indeed alluded to the «possibilidade qual-
quer compensação demonstrasse (...) apreço Santo Padre por Portugal,
tendo mencionado a tal respeito propósito enviar Fátima missão pontifica
para entregar Rosa de Ouro» 39. The attribution, to be announced at the clo-
sure of the third session of the Second Vatican Council, would occur
merely in the absence of any «reacção desagradável da nossa parte» to the
Pope’s visit to India, Faria was made to understand. In the near fifty years
since the first reported apparition in the Cova da Iria on 13 May 1917,
there had perhaps been no stronger evidence of the political symbolism
which the Fátima shrine had come to acquire. Throughout the Rosa de
Ouro episode, it was indeed considered almost exclusively as an instru-
ment of diplomacy: in the hands of the Vatican to silence the Portuguese
regime over the Pope’s visit to India; in those of the Salazar regime to
obtain reparation for the injury the visit had reportedly caused. Amere two
years later, the Pope would attempt to discard any politicisation of his visit
to Fátima. That such politicisation had become inevitable was perhaps not
the exclusive responsibility of the Portuguese government.
2. The diplomacy preceding the visit – Direct State interference
within the religious sphere: a visit much sought after by the
regime
If Salazar had been partially appeased, the general sense of crisis
between his regime and the Vatican was far from over. The conclusion of
the Second Vatican Council in December 1965 effectively signalled the
start of its implementation. Salazar’s discontent over the Pope’s visit to
38 Idem, p. 34.
39 AOS/CO/NE-30A, Pasta 10, 3ª Subdivisão, Aerograma Faria para MNE, 17
October 1964, p. 64.
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Bombay – which led him to such extremes as declaring that «enquanto eu
for vivo o Papa não entra aqui» 40 – progressively merged into his increasingly
divergent views upon the nature of Catholicism itself. The progressive –
indeed revolutionary – nature of the aggiornamento process initiated by
John XXIII, and to a large degree pursued and concluded by Paul VI, in
the internal life of the Roman Catholic Church is well known and need not
be presented here. It is important however to stress that to Salazar, it was
a process as erroneous as it was unacceptable, all the more so as develop-
ments in the Church were clearly beginning to overtake those permitted by
the regime in Portuguese society, a reality which a disgruntled Salazar was
increasingly becoming aware of. «Aí mesmo no Vaticano pensa-se muito
democracia cristã, pensa-se liberalismo, permite-se progressismo» he
wrote to Cerejeira on 21 October 1964. «Deus não permita que eu venha a
ver o resultado de tais doutrinas e atitudes em Portugal» 41. As Franco
Nogueira observed following the attribution of the Rosa de Ouro, Salazar
«não está convicto de que a política progressista do Vaticano seja alterada
durante o pontificado de Paulo VI» 42. It would not take long for his doubts
to be confirmed. «Isto é horroroso», he exclaimed upon seeing photographs
of the Pope at the UN 43. If Salazar so despised the direction that Paul VI
was defining for the Catholic Church, it was clear that should the regime be
actively manoeuvring for the Pope’s visit to occur, it was not for religious
purposes, and that it intended to benefit from it in other ways. The diplo-
macy which preceded the visit provides evidence of such manoeuvrings.
By mid-1966, Salazar «afirma que o governo português, como governo,
não dará um passo para trazer a Fátima o Papa, ou para o evitar», claims
Franco Nogueira 44. This claim was no truer than Salazar’s declared posi-
tion of non-intervention in the religious sphere regarding the Bombay and
Rosa de Ouro episodes. In fact it was less true still as the internal stability
of the regime deteriorated 45, and it consequently came to rely more heavily
upon its elements of traditional support.
40 Cruz, O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica, p. 174.
41 AOS/CO/NE-30, Pasta 10, 5ª Subdivisão, p. 90.
42 Nogueira, Salazar, vol. 6, p. 44.
43 During the Council of Ministers of 21 October 1965, in idem, p. 83.
44 Idem, p. 188.
45 Oliveira Marques defines the regime as increasingly affected by internal divi-
sion, despite the “aparências de ordem e de tranquilidade”, in his História de Portugal,
vol. 3, p. 417.
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On 11 February 1966, asked during a press conference about a reported
invitation by the Portuguese government to the Pope, Franco Nogueira had
declared that papal visits being of a «natureza especial (…), não podiam
mesmo ser objecto convites normais como para outros chefes de Estado pelo
que se devia deixar Papa toda a iniciativa» 46. This answer was interpreted
by the Apostolic Nuncio in Lisbon as signifying that the Portuguese regime
would not particularly welcome a papal visit. The speed at which the mis-
understanding was corrected by the Portuguese government once it had
become aware of it, however, quickly contradicted this interpretation. «Con-
viria (…) que na primeira oportunidade», Franco Nogueira instructed Faria,
«(…) Vexa deixasse cair Secretário de Estado palavras apropriadas» 47. It
was a first indication that the regime would intervene in order to generate
favourable conditions for the visit to occur.
A second telegram followed on 26 April 1966, through which the
Minister enquired as to how appropriate it may be for Thomaz to express
his thanks in writing to the Pope for the Esporão de Ouro he had recently
been awarded. The letter, he added, the Portuguese Ambassador would
then deliver in person to the Pope 48. «Afigura-se-me indicada carta pessoal
Sexa Presidente da Republica», Faria replied, «que entregarei Santo Padre
aproveitando eventualmente audiência tratar qualquer assunto maior inte-
resse parecesse conveniente abordar. Se Vexa concordasse iria rapidamente
Lisboa receber instruções» 49. The Portuguese Ambassador to the Vatican
was indeed subsequently called back to Lisbon 50. That the «assunto maior
interesse» to be discussed in Lisbon was most probably the potential papal
visit to Fátima the following year appears to be confirmed by the nature of
the first aerogram sent to the Foreign Ministry by Faria after his return to
Rome. «Disse Mons. Dell’Acqua que em Lisboa toda a gente (…) me per-
guntava se o Santo Padre iria a Fátima no próximo ano», he reported. «(…)
Aconselhou-me que não deixasse de o dizer a Sua Santidade na audiência
solicitada. Tendo observado que não ousava fazê-lo, Mons. Dell’Acqua
insistiu, dizendo que se tratava de uma informação interessante» 51. Faria’s
46 MNE, PEA 375, proc. 332,52, telegrama MNE para Faria, nº geral 1561, 19
March 1966.
47 Idem.
48 Idem, nº geral 2285.
49 Idem, Telegrama Faria para MNE, nº geral 3710, 27 April 1966.
50 Idem, Telegrama MNE para Faria, nº geral 2322, 28 April 1966.
51 Idem, Aerograma Faria para MNE, nº geral 4635, 23 May 1966.
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apparent reluctance to mention the subject during his audience with the
Pope reflected more than his personal apprehension to do so. The
Portuguese government, while prepared to actively intervene, was also
well aware of the delicacy of the matter and of how excessive zeal dis-
played in its pursuit may be perceived as an attempt to pressurise the
Vatican. Moreover, as it also well knew, by November 1966 «impunha-se
(...) um convite formal dos bispos portugueses» 52.
The bishop of Leiria had previously enquired as to the possibilities of
a papal visit with Dell’Acqua on 18 August 1966. At the Episcopal
Conference then taking place, he was entrusted with writing the invitation,
subsequently to be signed by the entire episcopate, under the direction of
Cardinal Cerejeira. It was subsequently delivered to Cicognani on 13
November 1966. There is no evidence of any relation between the govern-
ment’s needs and the Conference’s concomitant decision to formulate its
formal invitation, but the convergence in timing is noticeable. Cerejeira
also travelled to Rome where he attempted to influence the Pope, while on
25 April 1967 the bishop of Leiria renewed his invitation. The eagerness
with which the visit was sought much resembled a joint effort by the
national authorities both political and religious.
These efforts, however, first met with little positive response in Rome.
«[A] Santa Sé continua receosa qualquer iniciativa (...) possa representar
gesto simpatia pelo nosso país», Faria reported on 10 April 1967 53.
Believing to have reached the limits of diplomatic “correctness”, on 12
April 1967 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed him not to intervene
further 54. Barely a month before the fiftieth anniversary of the Fátima
apparitions, any hope that the Pope would attend seemed to have been lost,
all the more so following the nomination of Cardinal da Costa Nunes as
«Legado a latere» on 15 April 1967 to act as papal representative during
the ceremonies. Though not a definite sign of the Pope’s intention not to
attend in person – a similar Legate had been nominated for the Bombay
Eucharistic Congress – it offered little encouragement to the Portuguese
regime. It is a measure of its determination that it decided upon a final
attempt to influence the Papacy 55.
52 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 224.
53 MNE, PEA375, Telegrama Faria para MNE, nº geral 9803.
54 Idem, Telegrama MNE para Faria, nº geral 2179.
55 In contrast to the assertion made by Braga da Cruz that the papal visit, interpreted
as compensation for the visit to Bombay (highly improbable since, as we have seen, the
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«Concordamos Vexa acolha sugestão Mons. Dell’Acqua podendo
solicitar audiência Cardeal Secretário de Estado para os fins indicados
[which we can assume to be the potential papal visit] mantendo-se dentro
dos moldes (…) comunicações anteriores», Faria was instructed on 20
April 56. He then reported on positive developments on 23 April, the Pope’s
Secretary having enquired as to the capacities of Monte Real airbase, a
mere forty kilometres from the Fátima shrine 57 – to which the Ministry
replied that the airport could not accommodate aircraft superior in size to
a caravel 58. Abruptly, the Portuguese government then decided not to
attempt to influence the Vatican further. «Fizemos tudo quanto se poderia
(…) fazer dentro limites dignidade e correcção», it notified Faria. «Não
devemos tomar qualquer nova iniciativa (…), passando a cingirmo-nos
responder ao que nos for perguntado. (…) Qualquer outra atitude poderia
mesmo ser aí considerada como intolerável tentativa de pressão» 59. Three
days later, Faria was informed that the Pope would visit Fátima on the fol-
lowing 13 May, «se não houvesse objecção da nossa parte» 60.
Having attempted all that could be done «dentro [das] limites (…) [da]
correcção» to obtain the visit, no such objection would naturally be forth-
coming from the regime.
Pope had refused even to send his Secretary of State to Portugal for that purpose in 1965),
would occur in spite of the “resistência do governo”, in Nova História de Portugal, dir.
Serrão, Oliveira Marques, vol. 12, p. 221. Reis argues that most of the Portuguese diplo-
matic activity aimed at making the papal visit possible was carried out by Faria and Franco
Nogueira in the face of resistance from Salazar, in Salazar e o Vaticano, p. 308 and p. 318.
While the Portuguese dictator undoubtedly remained determined to vent his disagreement
with the Pope – be it merely to save face among his collaborators -, it is a policy that he
revealingly did not carry out to the point of raising insurmountable barriers to the Pope’s
visit, well aware, as the present work will attempt to demonstrate, of the formidable advan-
tages to be drawn domestically from the visit by his political regime.
56 MNE, PEA375, Telegrama MNE para Faria, nº geral 2328.
57 Idem, Telegrama Faria para MNE, nº geral 3166.
58 Idem, Telegrama MNE para Faria, nº geral 2413, 27 April 1967.
59 Idem, nº geral 2422, 27 April 1967.
60 Idem, Aerograma Faria para MNE, nº geral 3411, 1 May 1967.
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3. From the announcement of the visit to the visit itself
3.1. The Pope’s announcement speech or the impossible attempt
to depoliticise the visit
Paul VI officially announced his intention to take part in the Fiftieth
Anniversary celebrations of the first reported Fátima apparition – also the
twenty-fifth of the consecration of the world to the Immaculate Heart of
Mary by Pius XII – during his General Audience of 3 May 1967. From the
very start, he made every effort to remove any political significance from his
visit. «Esta peregrinação terá carácter absolutamente privado», he declared,
«[e] será (…) muito breve» 61. It was effectively limited to a single day, a fact
that the use of Monte Real airbase made possible. It of course also enabled
the Papacy to avoid having to make use of Portela airport, which would nat-
urally have given a far more official nature to the pilgrimage 62.
While the Vatican was anxious to avoid any politicisation of the visit,
it equally had to avoid overtly stating such an intent, which may easily
come to injure the already wounded pride of its host-to-be. «As nossas via-
gens têm este carácter (...) de brevidade», the Pope explained, «que os
meios de transporte modernos permitem e que as obrigações do Nosso
cargo apostólico Nos impõem» 63. As was thus clear, maintaining the visit
apolitical in nature would require a balancing act of the most delicate
nature, all the more so as the central reason invoked for the pilgrimage by
the Pope himself related to what was most likely to give it a political edge.
Indeed if the visit had been decided primarily in reply to the «pressões reit-
eradas e corteses do Episcopado Português» – in which as we have seen
the Portuguese regime played a crucial, though discrete, part – the «razão
spiritual, que quer dar a esta viagem a sua significação própria, é a de rezar
(…) pela paz» 64. Paradoxically, the Pope’s own stated intentions empha-
sised just how unfavourable to an apolitical visit the conditions were in
Portugal.
First, Paul VI explicitly referred to war, and to the Vietnam conflict
specifically, as naturally affecting the cause of universal peace.
61 “O Discurso de Anuncio”, in Acção Católica, nº 5, May 1967, p. 365-366.
62 While Franco Nogueira remarks that “facilmente, se chegou a acordo sobre os
pontos simbólicos da despolitização” - in op. cit., p. 279 – the impetus for depoliticisation
came from the Vatican, not from São Bento.
63 In “Acção Católica”, p. 365-366.
64 Idem, p. 366.
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«Queremos ainda esperar que novas propostas de negociações (...) não
serão rejeitadas, mas estudadas e finalmente aceites (...) a bem de todo o
povo vietnamita», he declared 65. It was his silence over the protracted
colonial wars the Portuguese regime was itself engaged in, however, which
attracted much international attention. Portuguese rule in Angola was
indeed under the combined – though not united – challenge from the
FNLA, MPLA and UNITA; in Guinea, it faced the well-organised struggle
of an increasingly threatening PAIGC, under the efficient guidance of
Amílcar Cabral; while in Mozambique, the continuing threat posed by
FRELIMO, though restricted to the country’s northern regions, was very
much a reality. Prayers for peace in the metropolis of a repressed empire
were always bound to become politicised.
Secondly, the Pope further remarked, «esta causa suprema da paz pen-
etra cada vez mais na consciência dos homens, (...) como coroamento
desejável (...) de todos os esforços tendentes a dar ao Homem uma vida
digna, na Verdade, na Justiça, na Liberdade e no Amor» 66. The fact that
none of the latter four ideals figured prominently on the Salazarist agenda
would once again mean that reducing the Pope´s visit to a purely private
pilgrimage would prove extremely arduous, if not impossible. The recog-
nised political symbolism of the Fátima sanctuary – highlighted once again
merely two years earlier during the Rosa de Ouro episode – would not help
either.
To Salazar though, such considerations mattered little. Quite the con-
trary, while naturally not relishing the negative publicity which the Pope’s
visit may generate internationally against his regime, its political signifi-
cance was precisely what his regime would seek to benefit from domesti-
cally. As he had remarked less than three years earlier, what would remain
as «um dos actos mais relevantes dos nossos tempos» was the mere presence
of the Holy Father on Portuguese soil – and that by his side, benefiting
from the huge political implications conveyed by the image, of the entire
Estado Novo ruling elite.
65 Idem, p. 367.
66 Idem, p. 366-367.
67 The Times, 12 May 1967, p. 10.
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3.2. Reactions to the announcement: international controversy vs
national jubilation and strict censorship
a) International controversy: the tensions surrounding the visit
The Pope’s decision to travel to Portugal generated fierce controversy
both for its religious and political consequences.
From the religious viewpoint, in the context of aggiornamento, the
visit bore numerous consequences. First, as Times special envoy Peter
Nichols reported from Rome on 11 May, the visit was «sure to damage the
cause of greater unity among Christians». Indeed, while the Pope
remarked with satisfaction that fellow Christians were ready to discuss
Marian devotion with greater openness than ever, his decision to lend his
weight «to the manifestation of the Marian cult at its most emotionally
questionable» 67 was hardly Vatican diplomacy at its subtlest. In effect, its
tactless assertion appeared to sharply contradict the ecumenical spirit of
the Council. Secondly, due to the nature of the host regime, the Papacy
risked losing its only recently acquired status as a force for progress.
Indeed the papal visit certainly risked «undo[ing] the impression that the
Church stands for progress in the developing countries of Africa particu-
larly, hampering the already difficult task of the missionaries» 68. Finally,
since Marian devotion was associated with the most conservative trend of
Catholicism, and as devotion at Fátima in particular was «unhealthy, dubi-
ous theologically and politically right-wing» 69, the Pope’s promotion of
the Marian cult would take on more than a mere symbolic significance as
the Council was being implemented. It constituted a clear call for restraint
regarding certain “excesses” committed in the name of aggiornamento.
Politically, the effects of the visit were obvious. First, by going to
Portugal, the Pope was acknowledging a regime both undemocratic and
repressive in nature, which furthermore upheld in Africa «the ideals of
trusteeship which the rest of the world has abandoned», as Daily Telegraph
special envoy Douglas Brown reported from Fátima on 12 May 70. Second,
despite his efforts to the contrary, the Pope’s presence risked lending
weight to the Portuguese regime’s virulent anti-communism – of which,
furthermore, the Fátima sanctuary had virtually become the practical
embodiment. By travelling to Fátima, Paul VI naturally had objectives of
68 Idem.
69 Peter Hebblethwaite, Paul VI, p. 485.
70 The Daily Telegraph, 13 May 1967.
346 DUNCAN SIMPSON
his own, as we shall later observe. Their realisation, however, would come
at the cost of formidable political benefits for the Portuguese dictatorial
regime. The first step towards ensuring these benefits, from the point of
view of the regime, consisted in silencing all criticism of the visit.
b) In Portugal: censorship and jubilation
In contrast to the international controversy, the news of the Pope’s
visit was greeted in Portugal with general rejoicing, a measure of the effi-
cacy of the regime’s censors and propaganda machinery. As Catholic
opponents to the regime had put it in 1965, «o público continua a dispor
de notícias truncadas ou deformadas com (...) o matiz que os serviços de
censura entendem transmitir-lhe» 71.
«A esperança da vinda era generalizada e profunda, mas nem por isso
a notícia deixou de fazer vibrar todos, sem exclusão dos próprios agnósti-
cos», the Diário da Manhã declared 72. The following day, the regime’s
official organ continued to highlight the joy of the entire nation at the news
of the Pope’s visit. «A nação inteira emocionada com a notícia da vinda do
Papa», the front page announced. Similar enthusiasm was shared by the
Diário de Notícias, which on 4 May devoted most of its front page to the
Pope’s announcement and equally highlighted the nation’s sense of jubila-
tion, an editorial line also adopted by O Século 73. The national press
reported none of the controversy surrounding the visit. The only reference
to it was made in the subtlest of fashions, as O Século quoted Mons
Vallainc (Vatican Press Secretary) as having declared that «as notícias da
imprensa estrangeira que sugerem motivos políticos para a viagem do
Papa (...) ‘estão a tentar deturpar as palavras bem claras do Papa quanto
aos objectivos da sua peregrinação’» 74. Since the reasons for such politi-
cisation were not mentioned, and as it was the foreign press which was
accused of “diminishing” the Pope’s pilgrimage, even this lone indication
reflected well on the regime.
The Diário da Manhã, Diário de Notícias and O Século clearly
reported, however, that the visit had been defined by the Pope himself as
a private pilgrimage. They did also make clear that the visit would be brief,
71 In Alves, Católicos e Política, p. 183.
72 Diário da Manhã, 4 May 1967, p. 1.
73 O Século, 4 may 1967, p. 1.
74 Idem, 6 May 1967, p. 11.
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though perhaps not as readily as the Diário de Lisboa 75. Clear signs that
the visit may not be to the liking of the nation as a whole were more surely
visible in the way Republica 76 chose to cover the Pope’s announcement.
Contrary to the rest of the national daily press, it devoted only minimum
space to the occasion and emphasised the private nature of the pilgrimage.
«O papa disse que a sua peregrinação seria ‘muito rápida’ e terá carácter
privado», it reported 77. In sharp contrast to the other press organs men-
tioned above, for whom the Pope’s visit became front page news from the
moment it was announced , it also made no further mention to the visit until
the 13 May itself. This fact testified to the ruthless efficiency of the Estado
Novo’s censors. The only tolerated form of protest was the least potent of
all as regards largely symbolic events such as a papal visit: silence.
The Pope’s visit represented a momentous propaganda opportunity for
the regime. Kept in the dark regarding the controversy surrounding the
event, the realities of the average Portuguese newspaper reader were of a
far different nature: the visit constituted a Pontifical blessing granted a
deeply Catholic nation, and consequently a stamp of approval for the
regime which presided over its destinies.
3.3. From private pilgrimage to national homage: adapting Paul
VI’s visit to the regime’s needs
If the press did devote some space to reporting the private nature of
the Pope’s pilgrimage, it did not prevent it from quite contradictorily
devoting more space indeed to presenting the visit as a tribute to the
Portuguese nation itself, bestowed on it by no less a figure than the repre-
sentative of Christ on Earth.
While the Pope’s announcement made not even a reference to
Portugal – but merely to the Marian sanctuary of Fátima – it was very
much the nation as a whole, whose “historic Catholicism” was furthermore
emphasised, that responded to it. The government noticeably expressed the
«honra (…) da Nação Fidelíssima perante este acontecimento da maior
relevância historica» 78. The impression was thus subtly created that rather
75 Declaring as early as 3 May that the visit would be “inteiramente particular” and
last only one day, p. 1.
76 Only newspaper of the republican left-wing opposition tolerated by the regime.
77 República, 3 May 1967.
78 In Nogueira, op. cit., p. 279.
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than on a personal spiritual pilgrimage to Fátima, Paul VI was on a visit to
Portugal as recompense for the nation’s virtues. «O Sumo Pontífice afirma
a sua benignidade por Portugal», claimed the Diário de Notícias 79. Close
association of the visit to the whole of the Portuguese nation was equally
pursued in O Século, as the 13 May 1967 was to be a «dia que ficará
inolvidavel (…) nos anais da Nação Fidelissima» 80. The Pope’s choice of
Portugal constituted a «marca do destino que fez sempre da ‘Nação
Fidelíssima’ e deste povo (...) de pioneiros do Mar os grandes missionários
de Cristo e da História» 81. The 6 May edition of the Diário de Notícias
went as far as justifying the Pope’s reluctance to use Portela airport.
Merely did it reflect the nature of all papal visits, it reported. «Paulo VI foi
em 1964 à Terra Santa, mas limitou-se a visitar Jerusalém e não foi a Amã
(…) nem a Telavive. (…) Foi a Índia (…), mas apenas visitou Bombaim.
(…) Em 1965 foi a Nova Iorque, mas limitou a sua visita às Nações Unidas
(…). Foi o Presidente Johnson comprimentá-lo à sede internacional da
ONU. O Papa não visita, é visitado» 82. That the Pope would not set foot
in the Portuguese capital thus in no way diminished his tribute to the
Nação Fidelíssima, the reader was led to believe.
Moreover the Portuguese ecclesiastical hierarchy itself contributed to
adjusting the Pope’s intentions to the needs of the regime. «Visitando
Fátima, o Papa engrandece o nome de Portugal», a jubilant bishop of
Leiria declared on 3 May 83. Before his arrival in Portugal, Cardinal da
Costa Nunes similarly contributed to re-defining the Pope’s pilgrimage to
Fátima as a nationwide tribute by declaring that «se até ao presente o Papa
tinha um lugar muito especial no coração de todos os portugueses, agora
conquistou-o de todo em todo» 84. In effect, leading figures of the Catholic
hierarchy, talking on behalf of the Portuguese nation, seemed only too
obliged in politicising the event by associating it to the nation as a whole.
The regime’s determination to associate itself with the Pope’s visit and
thus benefit from it politically was also to adopt more active forms. If the
private nature of the Pope’s visit denied the regime the opportunity to
associate itself with the illustrious pilgrim through official protocol, such
was not the case of the Cardinal Legate’s visit.
79 Diário de Notícias, 4 May 1967, p. 7.
80 O Século, 10 May 1967, p. 11.
81 Diário de Notícias, 17 May 1967, p. 1.
82 Idem, 6 May 1967, p. 1.
83 Idem, 4 May 1967, p. 7.
84 In Idem, 8 May 1967, p. 7.
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3.4. The visit of Cardinal Legate da Costa Nunes: active political
appropriation
The Estado Novo was to maximise the very official nature of the
Legate’s presence on Portuguese soil. The fact that the actual choice of da
Costa Nunes, former Portuguese missionary, had already been widely
interpreted as an «homenagem da Igreja à Nação Fidelíssima» 85 only faci-
litated the regime’s task in appropriating his visit politically.
It is a measure of the regime’s determination to maximise the benefits
it could draw from the visit that Salazar in person, who never previously
had personally attended a reception ceremony at Lisbon airport itself, wel-
comed da Costa Nunes in Portela on 11 May 1967 86. Among the perso-
nalities accompanying him were General Humberto Pais (representing
Thomaz), Franco Nogueira, Faria, Director of Protocol Emílio Patrício, the
Apostolic Nuncio to Portugal Mons. de Furstenberg and Cardinal Cere-
jeira. The typical mix of political and religious personalities contributed to
blurring the line between the political and religious. «Felicitamo-nos
mutuamente por esta insigne honra», the Legate declared upon arrival
blurring the division further, «e agradecemos a Nossa Senhora de Fátima
ter trazido a nossa terra o chefe supremo da Cristandade» 87.
Aboard a Presidency of the Republic vehicle, the Cardinal was driven
to the palace of Queluz, where he was to reside over the duration of his
stay. The following morning, he officially visited the President of the
Portuguese Republic in Belem, who in turn reciprocated the visit in Queluz.
Official protocol was clearly being exploited to the full.
The Cardinal was then taken to Fátima, where he was to officiate in the
Benção do Santíssimo Sacramento and Procissão das Velas. There he was
greeted with the greatest pomp and ceremony. Heading the reception com-
mittee which included political figures such as Franco Nogueira, Faria and
the ministers of Justice and of the Interior, was General Mario Romão 88.
The pontifical and Portuguese national anthems were played in succession
by a battalion of the Tomar 15th Infantry Regiment, followed by a «salva de
vinte e um tiros» 89, under the respectful gaze of the huge crowd of pilgrims
which had already assembled at the shrine. Similar ceremoniousness would
85 O Século, 12 May 1967, p. 1.
86 Carvalho, op. cit., p. 36.
87 In Diário de Notícias, 12 May 1967, p. 1.
88 Commander of the Terceira Região Militar, in Novidades, 13 May 1967, p. 1.
89 Diário de Notícias, 13 May 1967, p. 7.
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be pursued even after the papal visit had actually taken place. An official
banquet, attended by Salazar himself and the entire Portuguese govern-
ment, was held in honour of the Legate on the evening of 14 May in the
palace of Ajuda, followed by a reception «oferecida por Sua Excelência o
Presidente da República» 90. A full GNR company greeted the Legate as he
arrived at the palace, as the pontifical and Portuguese anthems resounded
once more 91. Finally, as the Cardinal left Portugal from Portela airport on
16 May, he was again granted full military honours in the presence of both
Thomaz and Salazar 92.
If the Pope’s visit was to remain private, that of the Cardinal Legate
could not have been made more official. As the Cardinal himself
remarked, he departed «o coração cheio de reconhecimento pelas inúmeras
atenções que me foram dispensadas oficialmente pelas autoridades quer
civis quer eclesiásticas e militares» 93.
3.5. Separation of Church and State? The Bank Holiday and
Amnesty Decree of 13 May 1967
Although Salazar persistently claimed to maintain a strict regime of
separation between Church and State, he did not hesitate to order the
passing of a Decree-Law on 9 May declaring the 13 May 1967, «data do
começo das comemorações do cinquentenário das aparições de Nossa
Senhora de Fátima e da visita do papa Paulo VI ao Santuário da Cova da
Iria», national bank holiday 94. Furthermore, as the Diário de Notícias
remarked, «o Feriado (...) é obrigatório para todas as actividades públicas
e privadas» 95. The State’s association to a purely religious event was thus
not merely symbolic, but effectively imposed upon all employers and
employees be they from the public or private sector. If the Pope’s pilgrimage
was supposed to be private, it certainly was made to feel most official in
nature to the Portuguese people.
Moreover, the regime sought to further associate itself with the Pope’s
visit by issuing an Amnesty decree on 13 May 1967. «O governo deseja
90 From the “Programa Oficial da Visita do Cardeal Legato a latere da Costa
Nunes”.
91 Diário de Notícias, 15 May 1967, p. 1.
92 Diário de Lisboa, 16 May 1967, p. 1.
93 Novidades, 17 May 1967, p. 1.
94 Carvalho, op. cit., p. 35.
95 Diário de Notícias, 11 May 1967, p. 8.
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que o memorável acontecimento (…) fique assinalado na legislação por-
tuguesa», it stated, «por uma ampla medida de clemência, que, inspirada
nos princípios mais puros (...) da fraternidade cristã, não deixara de ser
extremamente grata ao apostolado do sumo pontífice» 96. O Século further
reported that the decree would cover «numerosas infracções criminais»,
while preserving the «valores essenciais à segurança da colectividade» 97.
While its origin has been traced back by Carvalho to a written suggestion
by the bishop of Leiria to the President of the Republic on 10 May, the
Pope himself had in fact expressed his desire to see such a decree publi-
shed. On 9 May, Dell’Acqua had indeed presented Faria with a note hand-
-written by the Pope himself. «Não seria acto de grande homenagem a
Maria Virgo Clemens», the Holy Father enquired, «uma amnistia da parte
das autoridades portuguesas para qualquer categoria de detidos e especial-
mente para os que fossem presos por motivos políticos?» 98. Lisbon
obliged. Unsurprisingly though, the decree’s mentioned principles of
Christian fraternity would not extend to political prisoners. Once again,
the visit had been turned to the regime’s advantage. Though formidably
repressive, it was able to portray itself as a source of Christian clemency.
While few Portuguese may have been fooled, it was a propaganda exercise
which certainly did the regime no harm.
4. 13 May 1967: From private pilgrimage to “official” visit
4.1. Monte Real
It was a sign of things to come that even the Pope’s journey to
Portugal the Salazar regime should seek to “nationalise”. «La TAP se sen-
tirait pleinement récompensée par la présence du Saint Père à bord de ses
avions, raison pourquoi je vous confirme aussi que le transport en question
n’engagerait pour le Vatican aucun déboursement», the company’s mana-
ging director wrote to the Nuncio on 5 May 1967 99. It was indeed a pro-
paganda success of international proportions that Paul VI should step out
96 In O Século, 13 May 1967, p. 16.
97 Idem.
98 MNE, PEA375, Telegrama Faria para MNE, 9 May 1967. Franco Nogueira also
alludes to the Pope’s note, but highlights the decree as an initiative of the regime, op. cit.,
p. 286.
99 AOS/CO/PC-72, Pasta 4, 1ª Subdivisão, p. 246.
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of a TAP caravel at Monte Real on the morning of 13 May. “Nationalisation”
of the papal flight went as far as the use of specially crafted Vista Alegre
cutlery onboard, while eagerness to associate the papal visit to the nation’s
“glorious evangelising past” extended even to the interior decoration of
the aptly named caravel. «As caravelas quinhentistas!», Paul VI reportedly
observed as he entered the front section of the specially-fitted aircraft dec-
orated with pictures of the Fifteenth Century vessels, «numa alusão glo-
riosa à missão civilizadora dos portugueses», the Diário de Lisboa special
envoy aboard the aircraft reported 100. Neither did Salazar forget to remind
the Pope of their Indian disagreement by naming the TAP caravel Diu 101.
At 9:45, following a brief flight over the Fátima shrine which enabled
the Pope to witness at first hand the huge crowd of pilgrims awaiting his
arrival, the caravel touched down at Monte Real. While the private nature
of the visit denied the regime the use of full protocol, and while the Pope
was officially the guest of the bishop of Leiria – to whose diocese Fátima
belonged – it did not prevent both Thomaz and Salazar from heading the
reception committee at the small military airbase, accompanied by the
entire government, alongside leading ecclesiastical figures such as the
Apostolic Nuncio and Cardinal Cerejeira 102. To the Pope, Faria first intro-
duced Américo Thomaz. Then followed Salazar, «que cumprimentou o
chefe da igreja católica fazendo uma genuflexão e beijando o anel ponti-
fício» 103. In reply, the Diário de Notícias reported, the Pope «[deu] um
demorado aperto de mão a Salazar» 104.
Close association to the visit by the regime continued in the small tri-
bune erected besides the airbase’s main building, where Paul VI and
President Thomaz exchanged brief messages. In his welcome address, the
head of the Portuguese State once more highlighted the country’s title as
Nação Fidelíssima, «que não ostentamos com orgulho, mas apenas como
indicador de um dever apostólico a cumprir», clearly indicating that the
nation’s evangelising mission had not yet come to an end 105. Emphasizing
100 Diário de Lisboa, 13 May 1967, p. 16.
101 Evidence, however, contradicts Le Monde’s assertion that it was flown by the
grandson of Delgado, fierce opponent to Salazar assassinated by the PIDE in 1965, Le
Monde, 12 May 1967, p. 11.
102 Diário de Notícias, 13 May 1967, 2ª tiragem, p. 14.
103 Diário de Lisboa, 13 May 1967, p. 1.
104 Diário de Notícias, 14 May 1967, p. 6.
105 “Saudação do Chefe de Estado”, in Acção Católica, nº 5, May 1967, p. 368.
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the jubilation of the Portuguese people, «conhecedor do seu ânimo e da
sua fé», he once more expressed the honour of the nation as a whole at the
Pope’s visit 106. While Paul VI’s address focused on the nature of his visit
– a humble pilgrimage of prayer – it also partly echoed that of the
President of the Republic. «Desta abençoada ‘Terra de Santa Maria’ par-
tiu, no passado», he remarked, «(...) uma generosa plêiade de arautos do
Evangelho» 107. The reception ceremony, though brief and simple due to
the private nature of Paul VI’s visit 108, had effectively played into the
regime’s hands; the Pope’s mention of the nation’s evangelizing past
seemingly confirming the propaganda exercise interpreting the visit as a
homage to the Portuguese nation.
In a rare public display of emotion, Salazar «não pode evitar as lágri-
mas, limpando-as discretamente com os dedos», the Diário de Lisboa
reported 109. While it was an image which, symbolically at least, wholly con-
tradicted Salazar’s much asserted separation of Church and State, it was also
one most likely to stir the admiration of the Portuguese Catholic masses.
The difficulty experienced by the regime in directly associating itself
to the visit was highlighted as the Pope covered the final forty kilometres
to the Cova da Iria. Still, as far as was possible, it succeeded in doing so.
First, the open-top Rolls Royce used by the Pope, the national media
reported, was part of the Portuguese Presidential fleet 110. Secondly, while
the Pope’s cortege was to be composed solely of ecclesiastical figures –
another, earlier cortege had been organised to transport all political per-
sonalities to the sanctuary – it also included Franco Nogueira 111.
Moreover, alongside his private secretary, the Pope was accompanied by
the bishop of Leiria, who since 3 May had readily contributed to politi-
cising the pilgrimage.
Under the heavy rain, thousands lined the roadsides. Standing for
most of the journey, the Pope enthusiastically returned the acclaims. In
Leiria, the cortege came to a standstill, as Paul VI was awarded the keys
to the city by Mayor Bernardo Pimenta – an act which further contributed
to blurring the line between political and religious domains on this
106 Idem, p. 369.
107 Idem, p. 370.
108 Rather than to a deliberate “fria recepção oficial”, as has argued de Oliveira,
História Eclesiástica de Portugal, p. 282.
109 Diário de Lisboa, 13 May 1967, p. 28.
110 Diário de Noticias, 13 May 1967, 2ª tiragem, p. 6.
111 Until the city of Leiria, Le Monde, 14-15 May 1967, p. 1.
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momentous occasion. Already 100,000 people had greeted the Pope 112. In
the Cova da Iria, an estimated crowd of one million pilgrims welcomed him
enthusiastically as, at 1:13 pm, the cortege finally reached its destination.
4.2. In the Cova da Iria
a) The Pope’s homily
The Mass conducted by the Pope and the homily he pronounced on
the occasion were always going to constitute the day’s central event.
Would the Pope denounce certain of the Salazar regime’s most repressive
aspects? Would he speak out against the country’s colonial wars? These
were the questions that the international community, the opposition to the
regime and the regime itself all longed to have answered. In effect, it was
to the Portuguese regime that the answers would prove most pleasing.
Signs of divergence between the Vatican and the Portuguese regime, how-
ever, were clear.
First, Paul VI’s call for international conciliation was a certain, if indi-
rect, condemnation of war. «[A humanidade] possui um grande arsenal de
armas terrivelmente mortiferas», he deplored, «mas o progresso moral não
iguala o progresso cientifico» 113. Secondly, the Pope gave expression to
the Vatican’s policy of conciliation towards those nations under commu-
nist rule. «Rezamos por esses países», he declared 114. This was a tone quite
at variance with the uncompromising anti-Communism still promoted by
the Salazar regime in 1967 and which, as Costa Pinto has remarked, had
come to constitute one of the ideological pillars on which the survival of
the Estado Novo rested after 1945 115. It was a divergence of views all the
more noticeable as the Fátima sanctuary had very much become the
embodiment of the regime’s anti-communism. Though revealing as to the
nature of relations between Church and State under the Estado Novo, the
evolution of the ideological significance of the Fátima cult after 1926 will
not be addressed here, as not directly relevant to our subject. Suffice it to
say that already by July 1936, as the Civil War broke out in neighbouring
Spain, it was evolving from Christian regeneration to increasingly virulent
112 Diário de Lisboa, 13 May 1967, p. 28.
113 “A mensagem em Fátima”, in Acção Católica, nº 5, May 1967, p. 373.
114 Idem, p. 373.
115 Pinto, op. cit., p. 203.
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anti-communism 116. The trend deepened following the publication of the
Memoirs of the last surviving of the three shepherds, Sister Lúcia, and
most particularly of her Quarta Memória, written in 1941 at the request of
the bishop of Leiria. While the original 1917 interrogatories of the three
pastorinhos contained no mention of the future threat of Communism to
Christianity 117, she now claimed to have been warned, on the third reported
apparition – that of 13 July 1917 –, of a new world conflict to break out
under the Pontificate of Pius XI. «Para o impedir», Lúcia reported the
figure of the apparition to have told her, «virei pedir a consagração da
Rússia a Meu Imaculado Coração (…). Se atendem a Meus pedidos, a
Rússia se convertera e terão paz; se não, espalhara seus erros pelo mundo,
promovendo guerras e perseguições à Igreja» 118. As the Cold War deve-
loped in the post-1945 era, anti-communism became a central tenant of the
Marian devotion as practised in Fátima, which the creation of the Blue
Army of Our Lady of Fátima reflected in October 1947. It was all the more
so in 1967, as the Salazar regime sought to portray its colonial conflicts as
part of a worldwide anti-communist struggle.
To the crowd of pilgrims gathered at the sanctuary on 13 May 1967
though, and indeed «to the general public, (…) such subtleties [were]
unlikely to be grasped (…) They will continue to see the Pope’s visit as a
special benediction of the existing political order» 119. This was all the
more true as there was much in the Pope’s homily from which the
Portuguese regime could effectively take comfort.
First, the Pope warned against the effects of excessive modernisation
along the path to aggiornamento. «Que mal seria», he affirmed, «se uma
interpretação (...) não autorizada pelo magistério da Igreja transformasse
este renascimento intelectual numa inquietação (…) que substituísse a
teologia dos verdadeiros (...) mestres por ideologias novas (...) que visam
a eliminar da norma da fé tudo aquilo que o pensamento moderno não
compreende» 120. Salazar was no doubt right when later seeing in the
Pope’s decision an intention which suited his own brand of traditionalist
Catholicism. «Apercebendo-se dos perigos do progressismo, [o Papa] terá
querido (…) apoiar a ala conservadora da Igreja», he remarked during the
116 Torgal provides an excellent account of this early evolution, in As ‘Aparições de
Fátima’, p. 195-211.
117 See Documentação Critica de Fátima Vol. 1 – Interrogatórios aos Vidente, 1917.
118 Memórias da Irmã Lúcia, p. 167.
119 Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1967, p. 17.
120 In Acção Católica, p. 372.
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Council of Ministers of 23 May 1967 121. As a means to comfort conserva-
tive Catholics in the post-Council era, the choice of Fátima as a pilgrimage
destination certainly made sense. More broadly, as Reis observes, the visit
enabled Paul VI to fulfil «uma série de objectivos. Revalidava o culto
mariano e recentrava a Igreja nos tempos agitados do pós-concilio.
Amenizava, nem que fosse temporariamente [as the July 1970 papal audi-
ence of the leaders of the PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO would testify] as
relações com Portugal. (…) Afirmava ao bloco comunista que lhe negara
a entrada [in reference to recent plans for a papal visit to the Polish Marian
sanctuary of Czestochowa, abandoned upon intervention from Moscow]
que isso tinha consequências, levando o papa a visitar um regime que era
anátema para Moscovo» 122.
Secondly, and most importantly, the Pope had issued no direct con-
demnation of either the repressive nature of the regime domestically nor of
its policies towards its overseas territories. This effectively guaranteed the
political benefits of the visit for the regime through its impact on a popu-
lation kept deliberately misinformed.
The ruling elite, moreover, was determined to benefit from the visit
more actively.
b) Priests, politicians and private audiences
If the regime’s ruling political elite had not been able to associate
itself to the Pope’s «caminhada triunfal» 123 through the Portuguese coun-
tryside, it did so at the most important moment of the visit, the religious
ceremonies conducted by the Pope. Revealingly, little effort was made to
effectively separate ecclesiastical figures from their political counterparts
on the vast tribune erected over the Basilica steps, from which Paul VI
conducted the Mass. Directly surrounding the papal throne, chairs had
been put into place for Cicognani, Tisserant and Dell’Acqua. On their left,
«lugares reservados aos cardeais Costa Nunes, (…) Cerejeira, (…)
Palácios e (…) Rossi» were accompanied by «filas de bancos para o epis-
copado, para os membros do Governo e para o Corpo Diplomático» 124.
The Portuguese government in its entirety seated in close proximity to the
121 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 287-288.
122 Reis, Salazar e o Vaticano, p. 322-323.
123 Diário de Notícias, 14 May 1967, p. 6.
124 Idem, p. 8 (my italics).
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episcopate was an image that most certainly could not help but further
associate the political regime to the religious event. Moreover, to the right
of the Pope, several more rows of benches had been set up to accommo-
date Sister Lúcia and members of her family, along with other guests of
honour, including Thomaz, Salazar, the Presidents of the National
Assembly, Corporative Chamber and Supreme Justice Courts, numerous
members of Parliament, the civil governors of Lisbon and Porto, and fur-
ther civil and military personalities. Such ostentatious participation by the
State’s ruling elite in what constituted a purely religious ceremony – which
the Pope himself had insistently presented as a private pilgrimage – clearly
demonstrates the regime’s determination to appropriate the Pope’s visit
politically.
The regime’s close association to the religious ceremonies was not
limited to the presence beside the Pope of its highest ranking personalities.
Salazar was noticeably shown meeting Sister Lúcia as he arrived from
Monte Real. Though their conversation was brief, it sufficed to further
express the regime’s association not only with the papal visit but also with
the cult of Our Lady of Fátima. Secondly, several of the regime’s highest-
ranking personalities were granted private papal audiences. To this intent,
following Mass, the Pope, Thomaz and Salazar met formally, under the
eager gaze of journalists and photographers. Revealingly, Salazar’s usual
aversion for public manifestations of faith found little expression on this
momentous occasion 125. Both were then granted individual audiences
which lasted respectively fifteen and ten minutes. If the Pope expressed
any reservations about the Salazar regime, they were kept private 126. As
photographs of the ageing dictator greeting the Pope filled the national
press, the regime enveloped itself in its Christian cloak of legitimisation
through the most powerful of symbolic images.
To the further benefit of the regime, moreover, papal recognition
extended to its most repressive elements. Indeed, among the officials
whom the Pope decorated was PIDE director Silva Pais, whose implacable
125 Though Cruz highlights Salazar’s instructions to his ministers not to publicly par-
take of the Holy Communion - in O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica, p. 106-107–, it is a
preoccupation which their ostentatious presence on the papal tribune wholly contradicts.
126 By addressing Salazar as “Sua Eternidade”, the Pope may well have been making
clear that the regime had lasted long enough, see Reis, in História, nº 29, p. 27. Having not
been given public expression, however, it was a tone of irony that did little else than amuse
Salazar, see Nogueira, op. cit, p. 288.
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leadership of the political police very much explained its sinister effi-
ciency – of which the Pope was well-aware. Not only had the Frente
Patriótica de Libertação Nacional (FPLN) sent the Vatican a telegram
documenting the regime’s repressive exactions 127, a pamphlet denouncing
the repression carried out by its political police had also been sent to all
the participants of the third session of Vatican II. The decoration of Silva
Pais was an act that certainly exasperated the opposition to the Salazar
regime, which was already finding it difficult to counter the political
effects of the visit. Indeed all principal opposition forces effectively found
themselves “cornered”. Salazar was obviously delighted. As he was later
to claim, what he had personally preferred about the Pope’s visit was the
«fúria dos nossos inimigos» 128.
This observation though, belongs to the final part of our work, that on
the effects of the visit upon the Salazar regime and Portugal as a whole, to
which we shall now devote our attention.
5. The effects of the visit in Portugal
5.1. A regime rejuvenated
a) “Re-placing” Portugal at the centre of world affairs
The Pope’s visit being an event of worldwide dimension, it provided
Portugal with a dramatically enhanced international exposure. The (legal)
national press reported not only on the fact that it was the first ever papal
visit to Portugal – a feat achieved under the Estado Novo, which in itself
reflected positively upon the regime – but more importantly on the enor-
mous international interest which it was attracting all over the world, pre-
sented as greatly enhancing the nation’s prestige.
The Diário de Lisboa emphasised the weight being given to the Pope’s
announced visit in the Spanish and Italian press 129 and further declared that
the «visita do Papa a Fátima está a ter repercussão em todo o mundo» 130.
On 12 May, it also noted the «grande afluência de jornalistas estrangeiros»
converging upon the shrine, as by 11 May «1370 livres transitos [foram]
127 In Avante!, August 1967, p. 4.
128 Nogueira, op. cit., p. 288.
129 Diário de Lisboa, 4 May 1967, p. 21.
130 Idem, 9 May 1967, p. 1.
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passados pelo SNI para a informação» 131. As a measure of the international
attention the visit to Portugal was attracting, the Diário de Notícias
remarked that by 13 May Madrid would find itself virtually emptied of its
foreign correspondents, Fátima having become the centre of the «atenção
de toda a Europa e de quase todo o mundo» 132. O Século also highlighted
the «ressonância universal» which the Pope’s decision to travel to the
Fátima shrine had acquired 133, while the regime’s official organ, quoting
the bishop of Leiria, carried as its main headline on 10 May the claim that
«o mundo [está] de olhos postos em Fátima» 134.
Such claims were, of course, to a large degree true. As the trend of papal
visits was one developed by John Paul II, it is easy to overlook the inter-
national interest which they attracted in the 1960s. Since the national press
did not report that such world attention generally reflected negatively upon
the Portuguese regime, it merely portrayed the event as placing – or “re-
placing”, one is tempted to say in view of the heavy emphasis being laid
upon the nation’s glorious past – Portugal at the centre of world affairs. It
constituted a first victory for the regime’s propaganda machinery.
b) Re-affirming the regime’s ideological basis
The Pope’s visit also provided a momentous opportunity to return to
the “providential” themes which had so often marked the relations
between the Salazar regime and the Fátima shrine. «Então vivíamos (…)
na miséria», Gomes Branco wrote about the year 1917 and the First
Republic more generally in the columns of the Diário da Manhã. «Poucos
anos depois [das aparições], Portugal regressava aos caminhos da ordem,
do trabalho (...) e da grandeza» 135. Though the theme was familiar, the
Pope’s visit provided the much needed opportunity to re-affirm it in the
unsettled sixties, the prestige of the illustrious pilgrim seemingly confir-
ming its veracity.
The papal visit also constituted an invaluable opportunity to praise the
merits of some of the traditional values upon which the Estado Novo’s ide-
ology rested. The lives of all three witnesses of the reported apparitions, in
131 Idem, 12 May 1967, p. 18.
132 Diário de Noticias, 10 May 1967, p. 7.
133 O Século, 5 May 1967, p. 1.
134 Diário da Manhã, 10 May 1967, p. 1.
135 Idem, p. 1.
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particular that of Jacinta Marto – who had succumbed on 20 February
1920 to the influenza epidemic which tore across Europe after the First
World War, as had the third witness, her brother Francisco, on 4 April 1919
– were presented as embodying some of the values which the regime had
sought to inculcate since its inception. «A sua (…) edificante vida, o seu
estóico (...) sofrimento (…), a alegria interior com que recebeu o anúncio,
logo na primeira aparição, da sua breve passagem pela Terra, encerram (…)
um maravilhoso poema de humildade», the Diário da Manhã declared 136.
Such values as humility, abnegation and obedience were also suitably
found in abundance among the pilgrims who in their thousands converged
upon the sanctuary.
The Pope’s visit equally provided the opportunity to praise the
Portuguese peasantry as a whole, thus reaffirming the regime’s rural ethos,
on which the Portuguese people were increasingly turning their back during
the 1960s 137. Indeed, among these pilgrims, one element distinguished
itself: «é o homem e a mulher do campo (…) que tudo abandonaram para
estarem presentes na hora grande de Fátima» 138. «Na sua maioria são
gentes humildes das aldeias. (…) Deixaram os campos, as fábricas, a faina
da pesca, a fim de cumprirem promessas feitas em momentos de ansiedade»,
the Diário de Lisboa reported 139. Noticeably, most of these promises
related to the nation’s colonial wars.
Finally, the papal visit enabled renewed emphasis to be placed upon
the religious piety of the Portuguese people, encouraged by the regime in
its most traditional forms. As a Portuguese cleric wrote anonymously in
the French progressive Catholic publication Informations Catholiques
Internationales, the Estado Novo «reconnaît et flatte une petite religion
‘innocente’, faite (…) de cette piété individuelle qui aide les gens à
devenir plus soumis» 140. The Fátima cult, still in 1973 the «grand foyer
(…) du mysticisme populaire portugais» 141, certainly featured many of the
136 Idem, 12 May 1967, p. 1.
137 Rural exodus, urbanisation, industrialisation and mass emigration certainly meant
that new mentalities were emerging in the 1960s, as Portuguese society underwent “um dos
mais profundos processos de mudança estrutural da sua história, não obstante poderosos fac-
tores (…) de resistência que subsistiam, condicionando negativamente (…) o alcance das
transformações modernizadoras”, Rosas, in História de Portugal, dir. Mattoso, vol. 7, p. 419.
138 Diário de Notícias, 12 May 1967, p. 1.
139 Diário de Lisboa, 11 May 1967, p. 1.
140 Informations Catholiques Internationales, nº 288, 15 May 1967, p. 26.
141 Silas Cerqueira, in Revue Française de Science Politique, vol. XXIII, nº 3, June
1977, p. 481.
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deviations of traditional religiosity – a fact deplored by the progressive
Catholics themselves as they highlighted the «carences de la lithurgie» in
the Fátima Pastoral 142 – despite some efforts at modernisation and theo-
logical deepening of the Fátima “message” carried out by the Portuguese
Church in the wake of Vatican II 143. The use of expressions such as Nação
Fidelíssima by the Portuguese authorities, be they political or religious,
already bear witness to the propensity to highlight the Portuguese people’s
supposed attachment to the Roman Catholic Church. It was a point further
highlighted by references to the birth of the Portuguese nation under the
auspices of the Christian Church, the nation visited by the Pope being the
«velha e multissecular terra de Santa Maria, assim chamada desde os
primórdios da nacionalidade» 144. The pilgrimage of 13 May 1967, taking
on proportions unknown even to Fátima, seemed to constitute evidence of
such religiosity. Indeed, in the first half of May 1967 the shrine had
become the magnet to which the people’s traditional piety was irremedia-
bly attracted. From all over the country, the Diário de Lisboa reported,
«sob chuva torrencial milhares de peregrinos tomam os caminhos de
Fátima. (…) Embora fatigados (…), entram no Santuário a desfiar as con-
tas do Rosário e a entoar canticos em louvos a Nossa Senhora. Para trás
ficaram rastos de sangue dos pés, que são autênticas chagas» 145. «Os cam-
inhos pertencem aos romeiros», the Diario de Notícias also remarked.
«Não há, com efeito, ponto do pais donde eles não irradiem (…)
Caminhando, entoam canticos. Os campos perderam o seu silêncio habitual.
O Rosário é entoado por milhares de vozes» 146. Portugal herself piously
recited the Rosary, the reader was led to imply. If in the columns of theDiário
de Lisboa, no effective judgment seemed to be passed upon these humble pil-
grims, such was not the case in those of the Diário de Notícias. Relating to
the extreme difficulties of a pilgrim met en-route to the shrine, its chief edi-
tor commented: «sei que ela concluira sua caminhada. Uma força daquelas
vence todo» 147. As Silas Cerqueira observes, movements of popular mysti-
142 In Informations Catholiques Internationales, nº 288, p. 29.
143 Though the desire in certain Catholic circles for «uma pastoral [de Fátima](…)
que não se confinasse ao catolicismo mais devocional do mundo rural» would effectively
lead to a crisis between the ACP’s new lay leadership and the episcopate in 1967, Fontes,
in História Religiosa de Portugal, dir. Azevedo, Vol. 3, p. 260.
144 Diário de Notícias, 4 May 1967, p 7.
145 Diário de Lisboa, 11 May 1967, p. 1.
146 Diário de Notícias, 9 May 1967, p. 7.
147 Idem, 11 May 1967, p. 8.
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cism excercise certain «fonctions para-politiques»: “(…) en cultivant à
une échelle de masses ‘certains états d’esprit de type religieux’ (Gramsci),
ceux-ci servent de formidable force d’inertie et de conservation sociale»
148. In a context of urbanisation and industrialisation, to which Salazar was
only reluctantly giving in, the papal visit provided a timely opportunity to
once more call upon the inertia of the uneducated peasantry.
c) Uniting the Empire, “legitimising” the colonial wars
Much of the (legal) national press systematically linked the people’s
present piety to its glorious past as an evangelising nation. The Portuguese
nation was constituted by a «povo crente e ordeiro que descobrira novos
mundos ao serviço de Deus, construindo um império em quatro conti-
nentes», the Diário da Manhã affirmed on 10 May 1967. It was an inter-
pretation which fitted that officially promoted by the regime since the
1930s, replacing commercial considerations as the inspiration for the
Discoveries by the purely religious objective of spreading the Christian
Faith – and, naturally, expanding the Empire - throughout the world 149.
Where the regime’s propaganda was most efficiently able to actualise its
message was precisely in relation to the nation’s sense of mission as it set
out to build its Empire: «para melhor dilatar a Fé de Cristo nessas terras de
onde agora forças contrárias a Civilização Cristã nos pretendem arredar» 150.
The rhetoric surrounding the nation’s great role in the Era of Discoveries
was thus also designed to play a practical part in the contemporary national
political context and the event which dominated it: the colonial wars.
The idea developed by the Salazar regime of the nation’s «divine mis-
sion to civilise», coupled with the luso-tropicalist theory developed by
Freyre at the service of the regime from the early 1950s 151 was in need of
practical evidence by May 1967. As the experience of overseas assignment
became more difficult for the young conscripts being sent to Angola,
Mozambique and (particularly) Guinea, nationwide concern regarding the
inability of the military to bring the conflicts to a victorious end may soon
begin to emerge. While the Fátima visit could offer no hard evidence of
148 Silas Cerqueira, op. cit., p. 480.
149 Pinto, op. cit, p. 197.
150 Diário da Manhã, 10 May 1967, p. 1.
151 See Léonard, in História da Expansão Portuguesa, vol. 5, dir. Bethencourt,
Chaudhuri, p. 37-41.
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victory to come, it could provide ample proof of the “special” nature of the
Portuguese “mission” in its African colonies, a capital step towards justi-
fying the conflicts themselves – all the more so as the Fátima sanctuary
had rapidly become a centre of pilgrimage for Portuguese soldiers either
returning from the colonial conflicts or about to be assigned to them.
Such “proof” was first provided by the reported general enthusiasm
generated throughout the Empire at the announcement of the Pope’s deci-
sion to travel to the metropole. On 5 May, the regime’s official organ
already emphasised the «intense vibração em todo o ultramar português» 152.
«Desde Cabinda ao Cunene», it remarked about Angola, «reina a alegria».
It also highlighted the «jubilo sentido em toda a Provincia [de Moçam-
bique]», as well as in Guinea, Macau and Timor – where «todos os timo-
renses regozijam com a grande nova» 153.
Secondly, a generous amount of space was devoted to emphasising the
nation’s “special mission” itself. «A dominação [da minoria branca]»,
d’Assac – reporter and apologist biographer of Salazar – wrote in the
Diário da Manhã, «não é por ela exercida como branca, mas como civi-
lizada. (…) Em Africa (…) se trata de diferencias de nível de civilização
(…), de (…) subdesenvolvimento mental. (…) O branco, muito natural-
mente, é levado, não a dominar o negro, mas (...) a civilizá-lo» 154. That the
leader of the Catholic Church should decide to visit the mother country
lent huge power of persuasion to these claims. Such propaganda was not
limited to the pages of the regime’s official organ but revealingly found its
clearest expression in the columns of the «orgão oficioso do episcopado» 155,
Novidades. In these times of «criminosos ataques de que é vítima
Portugal», it recalled the nation’s action in Africa, «toda ela (...) de liber-
tação da pessoa humana». Portugal, it asserted, «fundiu com a alma dos
nativos a sua própria alma, vendo neles irmãos com iguais direitos e o
mesmo destino» 156. Much of the rest of the national press followed a sim-
ilar – if less extreme – line of argument, the Diário de Notícias most par-
ticularly. Reporting on the African soldiers fighting the “terroristas
invasores” alongside the Portuguese forces, it stated, «assim se demons-
trou que o solo pátrio é património sagrado de gente de todas as cores e
152 Diário da Manhã, 5 May 1967, p. 3.
153 Idem.
154 Idem, 12 May 1967, p. 5.
155 In História Religiosa de Portugal, dir. Azevedo, vol. 3, p. 135.
156 Novidades, 20 May 1967, p. 1 and 8.
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religiões. (...) Comandados pelo próprio soba», it remarked about the
Muslim soldiers integrated within the Portuguese forces in Guinea, «(...)
tem assegurado a defesa da região em que vivem sob a protecção da ban-
deira de um país multiracial» 157. That most of the Muslim Fula ethnic
group did fight alongside the Portuguese colonial forces in Guinea was
true, though not on the basis of a shared sense of nationality but rather as
a result of their already heavily compromised position vis-à-vis what was
now seen by much of the Guinean population as an occupying army 158.
The sense of unity of the whole Empire as expressed throughout its
shared enthusiasm at the Pope’s decision to visit the Fátima shrine also
took on practical forms, as the “overseas provinces” were called upon to
take part in the religious ceremonies which preceded the Pope’s arrival.
Such “mobilisation” was carried out first within the overseas provinces
themselves, as Procissões das Velas were organised in Lourenço Marques,
Luanda and Bissau. Additionally, an image of the Holy Virgin, blessed in
Fátima, was sent to Angola on 11 May, where it was received with great
enthusiasm and exhibited in Luanda cathedral until 14 May. Finally, each
colony was to be represented at the 13 May Fátima ceremonies –
Mozambique, for instance, by the bishops of Porto Amelia, Inhambane and
Vila Cabral 159. Additionally, a special “Ceremony of the Roses” was
organised in Fátima on 11 May, during which representatives from each of
the Portuguese colonies deposited flowers in the Capelinha das Aparições.
«Portugal na sua unidade de raças e cores vai depor rosas aos pés da
Virgem», the Diário de Notícias reported 160.
Thirdly the emphasis upon the special tribute to the Portuguese nation
which the papal visit was portrayed as added weight to the criticism of the
African nationalists which also filled the columns of the (legal) press.
Indeed, in sharp contrast to the mother nation – civilising centre radiating
its Christian values to its “overseas provinces” and host to the Holy Father
– the “barbarity” of the African nationalists was emphasised. «São
queimados vivos ou comidos os nativos aprisionados pelo MPLA», the
157 Diário de Notícias, 10 May 1967, p. 6.
158 Hierarchic ethnic groups such as the Fula tended to collaborate with the
Portuguese during the period of effective occupation – see Chabal, Amílcar Cabral, p. 20,
79 – assuming that it would enable them to maintain a certain degree of autonomy – i.e. the
traditional chief would keep control over the community.
159 Diário de Notícias, 10 May 1967, p. 7.
160 Idem, 12 May 1967, p. 9.
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Diário da Manhã noticeably reported 161. The same “barbaric” attitude was
attributed to Republic of Guinea President Sékou Touré as he expelled all
foreign Catholic and Protestant missionaries from the country. «Africano
no mau sentido da palavra e marxista, o Presidente era naturalmente
impelido para o campo da perseguição religiosa», the Diário da Manhã
commented 162, also seeing in Sékou Touré’s decision evidence of the
«fundo primitivo da superstição que, na alma negra, tem até agora resis-
tido a toda a acção educativa» 163. Additionally, the Pope’s visit quite logi-
cally enabled negative reports from the colonial conflicts to be buried
deeper still inside the daily press 164.
Finally, in spite of the political subtleties of the Pope’s homily, the
visit lent weight to the regime’s portrayed anti-communist crusade in
Africa, thus helping to justify its colonial wars. Linking these conflicts to
the war then dominating the international scene, d’Assac returned to the
pages of the Diário da Manhã to affirm that Cuba was attempting to open
up, «por conta da Internacional Comunista, um conflito ‘estilo vietenão’
em África, afim de aliviar os vietenamistas do Norte». «A resistência por-
tuguesa em África», he continued, represented the «único obstáculo, com
as resistências sul-africanas e rodesianas, à abertura da ‘segunda frente’,
tão ambicionada pelos estrategos do Kremlin» 165. Despite the Pope’s tone
of conciliation with Communism, his silence over the Portuguese colonial
wars did not help counter such justification. Neither did the discourse of
members of the Portuguese Catholic hierarchy. Noticeable in this respect
was the address of the Leiria Prelado Auxiliar during the 12 May Procis-
são das Velas in Fatima. «[É] indispensável renovar os votos pela Paz pela
continuidade da Pátria em todos os continentes e oceanos», he declared to
the huge crowd of pilgrims 166, thus succeeding in conciliating both the
Pope’s message of Peace and the regime’s policy of war. Support for the
government’s policy in Africa was also clearly expressed in the official
“revista de cultura do clero”, Lúmen, as it bluntly asserted Portugal’s right
to «defender o que é seu» 167.
161 Diário da Manhã, 8 May 1967, p. 7-8.
162 Idem, 7 May 1967, p. 1.
163 Idem, 8 May 1967, p. 1.
164 Such as the 30 April-6 May “Comunicado das Forças Armadas em Angola”,
Diário de Lisboa, 12 May 1967, p. 12.
165 Diário da Manhã, 11 May 1967, p. 6.
166 Diário de Notícias, 13 May 1967, p. 9.
167 Lúmen, vol. XXI, June 1967, p. 430.
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The powerful accumulation of these factors led the Diário de Notícias
to claim on 13 May that a «Nação inteira, católica, apostólica e romana,
aquela que se acolhe sem fronteiras, sem diferenças de credos, raças ou
línguas à sombra universal da Santa Igreja, ajoelha, emotiva, perante o
altar que é a Pátria dos domínios da Fé». The regime had succeeded in
turning the Pope’s private pilgrimage of peace into confirmation of the
nation’s “divine mission to civilise”, and not only justification for, but also
reason for the continuation of, its colonial wars. Modern technology would
enable it to extend its propaganda exercise further.
5.2. Expanding the effects of the visit: the role of television
Three distinct effects of the televised broadcast of the visit can be
observed. First it ensured that the largest possible national audience was
exposed to the visit. Secondly, it extended coverage to a larger world-
wide audience in a purely instrumentalist fashion. Finally, by highlight-
ing the RTP’s technological prowess, it endowed the regime with a
much-needed aura of modernity, at a time which tended precisely to high-
light the negative effects of the regime’s conservative policies upon the
nation’s modernisation.
Estimates concerning the number of pilgrims at the Fátima shrine on
13 May 1967 range from 750, 000 to 1.5 million, the generally accepted
figure lying at 1 million. To this substantial figure, television permitted to
add a far larger part of the population. Transmitted live by the RTP, the
event occupied most of the network’s daily programming. There is little
doubt that it succeeded in gripping the nation’s attention. Those who did
not own a set met in those cafés and restaurants which did – or were urged
on by manufacturers to purchase one 168. This student’s mother-in-law, then
a teenager, was taken to a (packed) restaurant along with the rest of her
family to follow the papal visit. In the rural centre of Portugal, such outings
were a rare occurrence, and testify to the importance of the event. Nor
was interest restricted to the countryside, as the capital’s deserted streets
on 13 May demonstrated 169.
168 As advertisements along the lines of “Fátima Dia 13, com Philips uma data histó-
rica em sua casa” flourished, Diário de Lisboa, 8 May 1967, p. 9.
169 Of which impressive photographs are to be found in the Diário de Notícias, 14
May 1967, p. 14.
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Televised transmission naturally extended across Portugal’s borders.
Through the Eurovision network, 14 European countries were granted live
coverage of the event. The regime’s instrumentalist use of the broadcast
was demonstrated first by its determination to ensure that the RTP con-
trolled the transmission. The RAI’s claims to supervision as the “official”
network of papal events were thus resisted. «Opinião pública portuguesa
não compreenderia que tivesse de ver por canal estrangeiro (…) trans-
missão TV cerimonias Fátima», Franco Nogueira conveniently reminded
Faria 170. Secondly, it was demonstrated by the regime’s attempts to control
as strictly as possible which journalists were to cover the event, as the inci-
dent over a RAI reporter named Colombo illustrates. Believed erroneously
by the Portuguese government to be the author of an «insultuoso programa
anti-português» aired by the RAI only weeks earlier, diplomatic crisis was
merely avoided by Faria’s investigations in Rome – where he was assured
by Dell’Acqua that it was a case of mistaken identity. The particular
Colombo travelling to Fátima «vai com instruções Director Geral RAI
fazer reportagem agradável nosso país» 171. Finally, it was demonstrated by
the reports sent from Portuguese embassies around the world to the
Foreign Ministry commenting upon the “results” of these broadcasts.
About the one on Brazilian television on 14 May, the Portuguese Consulate
in São Paulo notified Lisbon of the «bons resultados obtidos», having gen-
erated «uma reacção generalizada que nos é muito favorável» 172. From the
USA also came “favourable” results. The government’s constant preoccu-
pation with assisting US journalists in their mission while in Portugal –
such as providing helicopter delivery of the film footage from Fátima to
Lisbon twice for NBC on 13 May 173 – had paid off. «Os três principais
canais televisão CBS, NBC e ABC», the Portuguese Ambassador to
Washington reported, «transmitiram (...) cerimónias Fátima acompanhadas
comentários de forma geral muito favoráveis» 174.
By ensuring control of the televised broadcast, the regime was able to
benefit from its much-publicised success. To this effect, the written press
170 MNE, PEA 375, nº proc. 332,52, telegrama MNE para Faria, nº Geral 2735, 6
May 1967.
171 Idem, telegrama Faria para MNE, nº Geral 3592, 9 May 1967.
172 Idem, telegrama Consulado em São Paulo para MNE, nº Geral 3856, 19 May
1967.
173 Idem, telegrama Embaixada de Portugal em Washington para MNE, nº Geral
3630, 10 May 1967.
174 Idem, nº Geral 3714, 14 May 1967.
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joined in the propaganda effort. First, the highly technological nature of
the RTP’s transmission was emphasised in the regime’s official organ.
«Imagens do percurso até o Santuário (…) serão captadas por um carro
equipado com uma câmara e um emissor que transmitirá para um helicó-
ptero, fazendo este de estação relay, e dali para a regie final», it reported 175.
The modernity of the equipment at use reflected well on the regime itself,
answering critics which denounced the atraso tecnológico its reactionary
policies were generating. It was a point that the generous attention given to
how much foreign journalists had praised Portuguese efficacy served to fur-
ther emphasise. «O presidente da ABC (…) telegrafou mesmo (...) ao pres-
idente da RTP manifestando-lhe (…) a sua admiração pela magnífica
reportagem da visita do Papa», the Diário da Manhã further highlighted 176,
while also reporting that all US journalists had been «surpreendidos
[pelas] facilidades que encontraram em Portugal» 177. The Diário de
Notícias equally remarked that the «valor técnico do pessoal da TV mere-
cerem elogios de americanos e italianos» 178, while the Diário de Lisboa
observed that the international press had recognised the RTP’s work as
«excepcional, impressionante» 179. Such reports worked clearly to the ben-
efit of the regime. The modern technologies available to the RTP, along
with its professionalism, recognised by the international community,
implied that the Estado Novo was a force for progress. In the most unex-
pected of ways, the visit was again working to the benefit of the ageing tra-
ditionalist dictator.
It is a measure of how efficient the regime was in appropriating the
visit that the opposition met with so little success in countering it. The
Pope’s visit, indeed, left the opponents to Salazarist rule in disarray.
5.3. Trapped opposition, strengthened regime
By 1967, the Salazar regime had survived several attempts to overturn
it, be it through legal means or otherwise. From the 1949 presidential elec-
tions to those of 1958, from the March 1959Golpe da Sé to the January 1962
Beja rebellion, from the 1962 student demonstrations to the emergence of a
175 Diário da Manhã, 12 May 1967, p. 3.
176 Idem, 16 May 1967, p. 3
177 Idem, 18 May 1967, p. 11.
178 Diário de Notícias, 16 May 1967, p. 7.
179 Diário de Lisboa, 16 May 1967, p. 1.
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progressive Catholic movement, opposition to the regime was mounting
and expanding to new sectors of society. Conversely, in an international
context marked by Castrist seizure of power in Cuba in 1959, international
Guevarism and the Vietnam War, and a national environment dominated
by the colonial conflicts, opposition was moving further to the left and
undergoing a process of radicalisation, most noticeable with the creation
of Palma Inácio’s LUAR in 1967 180. However, by 1967, opposition forces
to the regime were also limited both by an increasingly repressive regime
and by persistent internal divisions – a trend which would deepen in the
early 1970s. Noticeably, 1964 witnessed the creation of the Associação
Socialista Portuguesa (ASP), barely a year after the Movimento de Acção
Revolucionaria, while a pro-Chinese section split from the PCP to form
the Comité Marxista-Leninista Português – initiating the grupuscolização
of the extreme left 181.
The Pope’s visit placed the already divided opposition to the regime in
a more difficult position still. First, the international stature of the regime’s
guest was naturally not one that was easily countered. Secondly, the new
orientation of the Catholic Church often corresponded with its own claims.
Had the Vatican not denounced dictatorship as a form of governance? Was
it not promoting social justice, freedom of expression and self-determina-
tion? About Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio, Casimírio indeed remarked
in the socialist-oriented Seara Nova, that the «espírito que presidiu à cria-
ção da Igreja de Jerusalém não morre. Guarda-se no coração dos melhores.
E logo começa a avivar-se dentro da própria Igreja que ia ser (…) o seu
túmulo. Esse espírito, desde São Paulo a Santo Agostinho, a João XXIII e
Paulo VI, (...) cresce em presença imperativa» 182. The ASP leader-in-exile
Ramos da Costa was also forced to partly praise the Pope’s encyclicals. «Il
y aurait pour le Pape une seule manière de ne pas apporter de caution à
Salazar» he declared, «ce serait de marcher (…) dans la voie des ency-
cliques Pacem in Terris et Populorum Progressio: confirmer la bonne nou-
velle de la décolonisation, condamner clairement la guerre coloniale,
désavouer (…) l’oppression policière» 183. As we have seen, the Pope
would do no such thing. Ironically, the spirit of Vatican II, which Salazar
so much despised, was working to his advantage, “cornering” the opposi-
tion further by denying it the possibility of frontal criticism. This was only
180 Rosas, in História de Portugal, dir. Mattoso, vol. 7, p. 542-543.
181 Idem, p. 542.
182 Seara Nova, nº 1459, May 1967, p. 157.
183 In Le Monde, 13 May 1967, p. 13.
370 DUNCAN SIMPSON
partly true when opposition expressed itself from exile, but in Portugal,
coupled to efficient censorship, it led to a predominantly pro-papal tone
even in the declarations of the left-wing. Seara Nova chose not to address
the visit. At the most it limited itself to indirect sarcasm, noting for
instance that the contemporaneous issue of Novidades «incluiu surpreen-
dentemente esta máxima de Luz Soriano: ‘Nada há pior, nem mais insu-
portável na sociedade, que o despotismo dos demagogos’» 184.
In 1967, the Portuguese Communist Party remained the «backbone of
[the] opposition» 185. Despite criticism from the radical left over its «ale-
gada incapacidade de fazer face à nova situação» (resulting from the active
opposition phase of 1958-1962) and its rigid alignment behind Moscow 186,
meaning that as early as 1964 both Delgado and the ASP had left the
Algiers-based FPLN, the PCP gained new impetus from its 6th Congress,
held in Kiev in September 1965. The Pope’s visit, though, was also to
place it in a difficult position. The Pope who visited Fátima was the same
Pope who sought conciliation with the Communist states and supported
self-determination. Not even the Communist Party, it seemed, could easily
confront Paul VI over the Church’s orientations. Again aggiornamento, in
a perverse turn of events, was working to the regime’s advantage.
In the Pope’s visit, the PCP faced two formidable threats: the poten-
tial division of the workers’ movement, whose unity it saw as the sine qua
non condition for revolution – as the Pope’s visit would provide moral
backing to what the Party saw as an «ampla campanha de divisão entre a
classe operária [conduzida pelos] monopólios capitalistas, a ditadura
fascista, o alto clero reaccionário» 187 – and its own alienation from the
Portuguese masses – whose religiosity it was well aware of. Both threats
it sought to counter by praising the new Conciliar line of Catholicism and
by exposing the unchristian nature of the Salazar regime.
As the visit was announced, the PCP’s initial reaction was to praise
the «esforço de milhões de católicos, que no mundo inteiro (...) lutam (…)
sinceramente pela Paz» 188. It was a sign of the progressive Catholic move-
ment’s growing importance that the PCP was eager to differentiate
between precisely those Catholics who followed the new Conciliar line
184 Seara Nova, nº 1460, June 1967.
185 Robinson, Contemporary Portugal, p. 80.
186 Rosas, in História de Portugal, dir. Mattoso, vol. 7, p. 543.
187 Avante!, nº 377, April 1967, p. 1.
188 Idem, nº 378, May 1967, p. 1.
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and the ecclesiastical hierarchy which stood behind the regime. The
Communists were largely reduced to the paradoxical position of writing
the apology of Papal encyclicals (those of John XXIII and Paul VI) and the
way their propagation in Portugal had been impeded by the regime –
though how much this also reflected the PCP’s own “especulações” over
the religiousness of the Portuguese masses, from which it was keen not to
alienate itself, also has to be asked.
While there was little in the orientation of Paul VI’s pontificate which
the PCP could more directly oppose – and well-aware of the religiosity of
its own people – it was effectively reduced to denouncing the regime’s
own unchristian nature in as much as it did not comply with papal doc-
trine. Cunhal’s 4 May 1967 broadcast on Radio Portugal Livre is particu-
larly revealing as to this particular point. «Quando católicos (…), mesmo
o próprio Papa, tomam posições que não servem os interesses da política
fascista», he stated, «Salazar não hesita em considerá-los imediatamente
como sendo do campo inimigo. (…) Os governantes fascistas, que agora
expressam tanto júbilo pela vinda do Papa Paulo VI a Portugal são os mes-
mos que criticaram grosseiramente a visita do Papa a Bombaim (…), que
censuram a publicação das encíclicas do próprio Papa Paulo VI quando a
sua doutrina não serve os interesses do fascismo e do colonialismo» 189.
The clandestine nature of the Communist organ, however, allowed it to
express far more critical views. Indeed it denounced the Pope’s silence over
the regime’s repressive orientation and colonial policies 190, but also some
of the Pope’s own actions, which contributed to the regime’s much-desired
politicisation of the event. «Recebeu (…) em audiência particular (…), os
escravizadores do povo português, os responsáveis directos pela guerra
colonial. Não é um tal acto de natureza politica?», the PCP deplored 191. It
also condemned the Amnesty decree, «espelho de hipocrisia fascista», as
well as the Pope’s decision to decorate Silva Pais, «director de um selvático
instrumento de tortura e de crimes» 192. If along with the fear that the regime
may come to succeed in its politicisation, «especulando com os sentimen-
tos religiosos da grande massa dos portugueses» 193, some hope had been
harboured about the Pope’s visit, huge was the disappointment as it
189 Transcript from MNE, PEA 375.
190 «Num país onde domina um regime fascista, mantido pelo terror (…), a voz do
papa não se ergueu», Avante!, nº 379, June 1967, p. 5.
191 Idem.
192 Idem, nº 381, August 1967, p. 4.
193 Idem, nº 378, May 1967, p. 1.
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unfolded. «Em nome da causa da defesa da pessoa humana, que Paulo VI
diz defender, não se louvam (…) assassinos», the PCP concluded 194.
If the PCP remained the opposition’s backbone, a significant new force
was emerging by 1967, the progressive Catholic movement. Paradoxically,
it was to be the most affected by the presence of the Pope of Vatican II on
Portuguese soil.
As we have seen, internal Catholic opposition had first emerged on a
noticeable scale during the 1958 presidential elections. If progressive
Catholicism found some expression within certain limited sections of the
clergy, and more so in lay activism, whose role was enhanced by the
Council – reflected in the preoccupation of the May 1967 Assembleia
Plenária do Episcopado «com a evolução da mentalidade que se está a
processar (...) nas camadas jovens do clero e do laicado» 195 –, it is in the
non-militant Catholic elite that it was given its clearest expression. During
the elections of 1965, leading Catholic personalities associated themselves
with the opposition for the first time through the celebrated “Manifesto of
the 101”, a concerted denunciation of Salazarism in the light of papal doc-
trine 196. Published in the national press, it had been a major victory for pro-
gressive Catholicism, exposing the «monstruosa mistificação do pseudo
Estado Católico, que se serve da Igreja para manter (...) o Pais (...) debaixo
do jugo de um regime que oprime (...) os direitos dos homens por entre fari-
saicas exibições de religiosidade» 197. The movement also exerted its influ-
ence through Catholic cooperatives, the most important of which being the
Lisbon-based Pragma established in 1965. Forcibly shut down by the
regime on 11 April 1967, shortly before the Pope’s visit, it was a sign of the
movement’s growing influence. Despite increased collaboration between
socialists and progressive Catholics 198, the trend developed as a movement
of Christian conscience rather than as a united political front, contributing
both to the “dispersed” nature of the movement itself 199 and to the frac-
tionalisation of the opposition as a whole. It was also conversely what lent
194 Idem, nº 381, August 1967, p. 4.
195 In Acção Católica Portuguesa, nº 385, Março-Maio 1967, p. 21-22.
196 In Alves, op. cit., p. 175-208.
197 In clandestine progressive Catholic Direito a Informação, nº 7, undated (circa
December 1965), p. 1.
198 Noticeable in October 1966 as five personalities including Mario Soares and
Catholic lawyer de Sousa Tavares jointly attempted to organise a series of topical lectures,
in Kay, op. cit., p. 391.
199 Raby, Fascism and Resistance in Portugal, p. 233.
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greater efficiency to its «efeito corrosivo (…) nos pilares ideológicos do
Estado Novo» 200. As Rosas remarks, it came to bear no less than an «enorme
impacte na desagregação ideológica do regime» 201. The visit of Paul VI
paradoxically stopped the movement in its tracks.
An extract from progressive Catholic João Bénard da Costa’s Nós, Os
Vencidos do Catolicismo shows just to what extent: «Que após [suas] via-
gens de sentido tão aberto ao diálogo com o mundo contemporâneo (…) o
Papa viesse agora a Portugal, ao Portugal de Salazar, pareceu-nos devas-
tador» 202. Progressive Catholics found themselves in an untenable situa-
tion. «Deixava-nos perfeitamente encurralados: não podíamos saudar a
vinda do Pontífice [sabendo que era fatal o aproveitamento politico que o
governo ia fazer desta visita] também a não podíamos condenar, para não
nos situarmos na mesma posição que tantas vezes tínhamos assacado aos
católicos salazarentos: a falta de sintonia com o pensamento e a acção do
Papa» 203. Just how “trapped” the movement was is shown by the coverage
of the Pope’s visit in the progressive Catholic publication O Tempo e o
Modo. Once again it was left with little option than almost total silence.
The briefest of allusions to the visit to which it was reduced do however
convey its sense of injury. Under a section entitled “Crítica de Noticiário”
– in which any article from the national press particularly deserving of it
was satirically exposed– a specially written poem about the Pope’s visit,
published in the Ecos de Extremoz, was given renewed publication 204. In
its July to October edition, the same sarcastic treatment was reserved to the
Nuncio’s address as he departed from his function 205. Effectively
“trapped” by the nature of the visit and efficiently muzzled by the regime’s
censors, progressive Catholicism was relegated to the underground world
of clandestine publications – where it directly denounced the misery to
which the regime condemned the rural world, the colonial wars, and the
hierarchy’s complicity with the dictatorial regime 206. By his presence at
Salazar’s side, Paul VI effectively called into question the credibility of
200 Almeida, in História, nº 8, p. 61. To which may be added the fact that it emanated
from the “coração do regime”, idem.
201 In História de Portugal, dir. Mattoso, vol. 7, p. 543.
202 Costa, Nós, os Vencidos do Catolicismo, p. 84.
203 Idem.
204 O Tempo e o Modo, nº 49, May 1967, p. 524-525.
205 Idem, nº quádruplo 50-53, June-October 1967, p. 656.
206 In Direito a Informação, nº 2 (circa January 1964), nº 3 (circaAugust 1964), nº 8
(circa January 1966) respectively.
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the progressive movement. Quite paradoxically, the increasingly painful
thorn of Conciliar Catholicism had been removed (though only tempora-
rily) from the regime’s side by the Pope himself.
The attempts made by the opposition movements to vent their disap-
proval during the visit – the FPLN issuing a radio call for its militants to
disrupt the Pope’s journey from Monte Real to Fátima 207 – had been effi-
ciently silenced by the regime. The opposition in disarray, the internal
position of the Salazar regime had very concretely been strengthened poli-
tically by the visit.
Conclusion: a regime re-legitimated
The papal visit constituted a diplomatic coup of momentous propor-
tions for the Salazar regime. Not only had it permitted to once again legit-
imise the Estado Novo in the eyes of the Portuguese Catholic masses
through the most powerful of symbols, it had also, owing to the mecha-
nisms of efficient censorship and the active collaboration of the majority
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy with the regime, been used to “re-place” the
nation at the centre of world affairs, re-affirm the regime’s ideological
basis, “legitimise” the colonial wars and ultimately present the Estado
Novo as a force for progress.
Into an ageing regime, the papal visit injected new life, delaying fur-
ther its increasingly inevitable collapse, to the extent that it does not seem
excessive to suggest that subsequent developments may have been diffe-
rent had it not taken place. Progressive Catholicism, so severely discredited
by the papal visit, may most noticeably have developed far more rapidly
and enabled an earlier transfer to democracy following Salazar’s incapa-
citation in 1968.
The visit and its effects upon the nation, as well as the role played by
the national ecclesiastical hierarchy throughout, are proof of the Catholic
Church’s fundamental part in legitimising the Estado Novo still – and one
may argue, more than ever – in the changing 1960s, despite the notable
efforts of a limited number of progressive clerics and lay Catholic
activists. Though the extent to which the Catholic Church had participated
207 «Em todo o percurso (…) escrever por toda a parte: ‘Portugal sim, Salazar não’,
[e] gritarmos: ‘Queremos liberdade!’», in MNE, PEA 375, “AVoz da Liberdade” transcript
of 7 May 1967.
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in the regime’s early establishment and subsequent consolidation, as well
as influenced its eventual downfall in 1974, remains to be accurately
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